

JPRS-WER-84-148

6 December 1984

# West Europe Report

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6 December 1984

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JORGENSEN'S ARGUMENTS FOR 'ZONE' SIMILAR TO SOVIETS'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 2-8 Nov 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Anker and the Bomb"]

[Text] Anker Jorgensen's security policy viewpoints simply do not make sense.

This is something which would be of little importance if Anker Jorgensen merely was a genuine and sincere, worried private person.

That he also is, but he is, of course, more than that, and, then, the matter takes on entirely different dimensions.

For Anker Jorgensen is a man supported by many voters and enjoying much credibility among the population. He is the chairman of the Social Democratic Party, re-elected by its congress, the party in Denmark with the largest number of supporters and he is thus the person who, in case of a change of government, is the most likely one to take over the post as the country's prime minister and responsible government leader.

Anker Jorgensen's viewpoints on our security policy, therefore, are the views of the Social Democratic Party on that matter, and they may sometime in the future become the views of a new Social Democratic government.

That is what frightens friends and delights enemies of a wholehearted Danish participation in the Atlantic defense community.

Anker Jorgensen, it is true, supports Denmark's continued membership in NATO, but his words and political actions, unfortunately, show that he has got no idea of NATO's *raison d'etre*.

Without a joint nuclear strategy, there will be no NATO that is worth having. However, Anker Jorgensen, at present, openly opposes very essential elements of the joint defense strategy.

Anker Jorgensen, at present, pursues a foreign policy and security policy in the form of exorcism, but nuclear weapons cannot be exorcised by holding, like some kind of signalman, the stilized symbols of ND, nuclear disarmament, in front of one.

What serious efforts have aimed at since 1945 is learning to live with the nuclear bomb, for it is not possible to wish it dead. Inventions cannot be undone, and the production of nuclear weapons is today within the reach of lots of countries in the world.

We have actually succeeded in getting the maximum use of the new invention.

The strategic balance is probably a Damocles sword suspended over our heads, however, it is a sword in the service of peace.

Anker Jorgensen says that nuclear arms are offensive weapons, and they were certainly used as offensive weapons by the United States against Japan in August of 1945.

They might also have been used by the United States as offensive weapons from 1945 until the Soviet Union got its atom bomb in 1949. However, it was not done. The United States did not misuse its nuclear bomb monopoly, for a democracy can only defend itself. It cannot attack.

And from the time in the fifties when both of the superpowers possessed the secret of the bomb, it ceased to be an offensive weapon. It became a deterrent weapon and only that. Anker Jorgensen says the nuclear weapon is an offensive weapon and, at the same time, a suicide weapon.

He is mistaken. His thinking does not make sense. For it is the very nature of suicide weapon of the nuclear weapon which makes it impossible to use it for attack purposes.

The ability to retaliate in case of an attack has been the very basis for the equilibrium which has been the most important peace-preserving factor for over 30 years now.

It has been a surprisingly stable equilibrium and not an unstable equilibrium which might be upset at the slightest change in the situation.

This was the strong effect of the balance of terror, that convenient, but equivocal expression of the press which has too often been misunderstood by the public as a picture of the sufferings brought about by the war but which was interpreted correctly by the rulers of the world as the threat needed to avert war.

It is frightening that Anker Jorgensen who, several times, has been his country's responsible government chief, and who aims at taking over that post again, clearly has not recognized that the nuclear weapon is a deterrent instrument, which has worked according to the intentions.

It is a weapon which can never be used physically, but only psychologically if we have in mind global warfare, the third world war. It is a political weapon, not a military weapon. Therefore, Anker Jorgensen's fear of the balance of terror is ill-placed and his fear of the bomb irrational.

The risk of war is only increased when the strategic balance becomes too much disturbed, when the equilibrium which has been developed with difficulty becomes disturbed. However, that is exactly what Anker Jorgensen and those similarly disposed are in the process of doing.

Political sleepwalkers are potentially dangerous, and Anker Jorgensen is a sleepwalker when it comes to security policy issues. He walks around in a dream world and does not want to wake up to reality. That is why he encounters so many contradictions in his own set of arguments.

Anker Jorgensen wants for the nuclear threshold in Europe to be raised, but the policy which he pursues causes it, on the contrary, to become lowered. For the moment when tactical nuclear weapons and intermediate-range weapons are taken in use by the West to counter a Soviet attack with classical, conventional weapons, becomes advanced if no other means of defense are available with which to stop the attackers.

And where Anker Jorgensen has political influence and parliamentary power he forces the government in power to enter into defense compromises which actually involve a weakening of our defensive power.

Where Anker Jorgensen has political influence and parliamentary power he tries with offensives from time to time to force the government in power to undertake a change in its security policy course which, in the long run, will make it impossible for Denmark to meet its commitments as a full member of the Atlantic Treaty.

If the resolution adopted by the Social Democratic Party at its congress in September of this year to the effect that the party "will work actively for keeping Denmark free of nuclear weapons in times of peace, crisis and war" becomes the political will of the majority of the Folketing and thus binding upon the government, the reinforcement agreements with our allies in NATO will have to be renegotiated with a result which may mean less protection for Denmark.

Denmark will then come to stand outside the joint nuclear strategy of the alliance, not like France which has taken national steps to secure its defense, including its nuclear arms defense, and which, incidentally, has never failed NATO politically when it came to sticking together, but as a country which wants to receive but not give, a country which maintains a semi-neutral status within the frameworks of NATO.

The cornerstone of Anker Jorgensen's security policy seems at the moment to be the establishment of nuclear-arms free zones in Europe. He thus takes over an argumentation which in the dialogue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has hitherto only been used in the field on the part of the East.

No practical arms control or disarmament advantages are associated with the idea. It is quite easy shooting across such zones, and they will, moreover, not be respected in case of war. However, the idea may serve to weaken NATO to the extent that a few NATO countries such as Denmark may be brought to break the joint nuclear strategy by declaring their national territories nuclear free.



If the establishment of nuclear-arms free zones in the Nordic countries, Central Europe and the Balkans would be one of the measures which, according to Anker Jorgensen, ought to be introduced to create confidence in the East-West relations, there is at least one more important thing which he has overlooked.

It is not of paramount importance to gain the confidence of our potential enemies. It is actually far more necessary today to maintain or re-establish the confidence in us among those who are our friends.

According to the Gyldendal Dictionary, zone therapy in the medical sense is "manual treatment of predetermined areas of the feet and hands after which effects upon, and improvements of diseases in other parts of the body or organs will be observed. Well-controlled studies have not yet been produced, and the method of treatment is especially used by non-medical therapists."

Applied to the area of security policy, zone therapy appears to be even more amateurish, and Anker Jorgensen may hardly expect from his pressures on the northern extremities of NATO that Europe will be cured of its fear of the bomb.

The treatment of negotiations is more recommendable. After all, it is being practiced by experts in arms control and disarmament, by people who primarily use their intelligence as instrument.

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## SCHLUTER AT CONSERVATIVES' COUNCIL DISCUSSES AGENDA

## Sees Renewed Security Consensus

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 2-8 Nov 84 p 2]

[Interview with Prime Minister Poul Schluter by John Wagner; date and place not given]

[Text] At the Social Democratic congress, 15-19 September, former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen asked himself if it was still--as his predecessor Viggo Kampmann once said it was--good to be a Social Democrat and the answer was: "Yes and at least it is very interesting."

At the Liberal Party congress a few days later, the newly-elected chairman of Denmark's Liberals, Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said--with a poorly-concealed reference to the Social Democrats--that "it is good to be a Liberal."

This week it is the turn of the Conservative Party, which is holding a national council meeting in Vejlbj-Risskov Hall in Aarhus. How is it to be a Conservative? The party's undisputed leader for over 10 years, Prime Minister Poul Schluter, has no doubts at all:

"It is wonderful--just wonderful."

Before the national council meeting, the weekend edition of BERLINGSKE AFTEN asked Poul Schluter what it means to be a conservative in a modern society and how it feels to be accused of pursuing a barbaric policy and of being arrogant and superior toward wage earners.



It was 10 years ago--at the national council meeting of the Danish Conservative Party in Helsingor on 28-29 September 1974--that Poul Schluter, who has since become Denmark's prime minister, was elected chairman of what was then a party in ruins.

Six months before that he became chairman of the Conservative group in Folketing--16 disillusioned and confused members of parliament who did not know, or at least could not agree on how to take up the fight against the Progressive Party and the Center-Democrats who had helped to cut in half the number of Conservative seats in Folketing in the landslide election of December 1973.

At the national council meeting in Helsingor, members of KU [Conservative Youth] passed out badges with the message that "it is lovely to be a Conservative"--a form of gallows humor that belonged to the 1970's that was emphasized when in his first Folketing election as party leader in January 1975, Poul Schluter lost 6 of those 16 seats.

The Folketing group had to suffer the humiliation of leaving their traditional Room 28 at Christiansborg and could have held their group meetings in a telephone booth, as the saying went then, or at least in Poul Schluter's modest office.

The election defeat led to new soul-searching--and an announcement from the national council meeting in Copenhagen in 1975 that now the party would pursue a clearly conservative policy. This was said at the same time that the Conservatives were eagerly working to form a compromise with the Social Democrats and become the "nonsocialist votes that work." They succeeded with both endeavors.

In the February 1977 election the party went from 10 to 15 seats and in October 1979 the number of seats rose to 22. Now the Conservative ranks were again equal to the Liberals and larger than the Progressives. The gains continued in the December 1981 election--from 22 to 26 seats--and 2 years later, on 10 January 1984, the party got its best election results to date with 788,224 votes, 23.4 percent, giving the Conservatives 42 seats in Folketing.

Never before in its parliamentary history has the Conservative Party been so large and had so much influence on Danish politics. Poul Schluter is given the main credit. He was, as it has been said, the right man in the right place at the right time. And this happened at a time when it is no longer oldfashioned to be conservative.

#### Voters Have Confidence in Party

"A stable and growing number of voters identify with what we stand for, namely a moderate, modern conservative policy. And--which is very important--the voters have confidence in the Conservative Party. That is the explanation for our gains and our renewed influence," said Poul Schluter, who went on:

"When I think of the election in January and the EC election after that, when for the first time we got more votes than the Social Democrats, I remind

myself that there must be many voters who put their mark by the Conservative nominees' names for the first time. If we ask them if they are now 'real conservatives,' they would certainly answer: 'Good God, no.' The truth is that very few voters cast their ballot on the basis of an overriding ideological point of view. Most people vote on the basis of what they think is best here and now. Of course our new voters also have a view of life that is close to ours, but when one has had such a wonderful election day as we had on 10 January, the wisest and most correct thing we can say to ourselves is that we should at least not be more conservative than we have been so far. We should accept the warm handshake we have been given--with the understanding that we must now be an even broader and more popular movement than we were before. For all those who voted for us on 10 January must be welcome too.

[Question] Does that mean that you have had a very definite change of heart since the national council meeting in 1975 when you said that "the party must outline a clear conservative policy" and "the only way one can do that is to lie clearly to the right of the middle in Danish politics"?

[Answer] I have always been a little nervous about using those terms--right and left. But at that time, in the mid-1970's, we were in the middle of a difficult clarification process. Therefore we had to outline a strong profile, but...if by right-wing one means something to the effect of hidebound, reactionary and static, I think we could say with some accuracy that today many Social Democrats and union groups, especially the Semiskilled Workers' Union, are right-wing. They are the ones who are opposed to any changes--including changes for the better.

Before the January election, the Social Democrats ran a campaign under the slogan: "fight conservatism." They thought it was a smart idea, but it was not. They quite overlooked the fact that we had taken up the fight ourselves--in the sense that we ourselves had transformed a conservatism that had been somewhat backward and oldfashioned.

[Question] Transformed it to what?

Conservative, But...

[Answer] To something much broader and more popular.

There are not many people in the Liberal Party who are pure liberals in the oldfashioned sense. Most Social Democrats would not care to be called socialists. Many would regard that as a direct term of abuse. Likewise there are not many people in the Conservative Party who regard themselves as conservative in the strictly historical sense. Therefore we must stress both concepts in the party name [Conservative People's Party], the conservative and the popular aspects.

Let me put it this way: I may be conservative, but not to that extent.

Being conservative means among other things stressing the uniqueness of the individual and the idea that the state should accept the fact that each of us must try to live a private existence in accordance with our personal characteristics and interests. It is the strength and wealth of Danish society that we are so very different--and that we are allowed to be different.

Being conservative also means that one simultaneously respects private ownership and accepts the idea that the capitalistic tiger should be toothless--we need the tiger's power, but we have to look out for his teeth. This means that we oppose tendencies toward a dangerous concentration of capital and development trends that lead to excessive inequity.

[Question] You have said of conservatism as an idea that it is "the idea of the greatest possible freedom for individual life development coupled with a sense of responsibility and self-control, so that one can live up to the requirement that others must have the same chance to develop their own lives as one has oneself."

[Answer] Yes, that is a true paradox. Time after time we must consider whether it is right to fulfill our need for individuality or the need for solidarity. Solidarity is a fancy word--but it is not the same thing as believing that all problems must be solved collectively. Nor do I accept the expression that many oldfashioned liberals and conservatives seem to like so much, namely that "every man is the architect of his own fortune." Wait a minute. We do not all have the same equal opportunities. Some are born with handicaps--others acquire them at some point in their lives. I hope that in the years ahead we can do a clearly better job of taking care of the people who are in real social need--while on the other hand providing far less in transfer payments to people who can, or at least should be able to take care of themselves.

[Question] Critics of the government's tight fiscal policy, including the budget compromise and the idea of maintenance allowance reforms, will say that the feeling of responsibility and solidarity you are talking so warmly about here is not worth much.

#### Criticism Unfair

[Answer] That is a professional campaign that the Social Democrats and certain unions are waging against us. I can well understand that they have a need to stand out externally in a difficult period when they have many internal problems--but it is extremely unfair. Let me mention some figures that illustrate how outrageously someone like Hardy Hansen [chairman of the Semi-skilled Workers' Union, Ed.] treats us, for example.

It is claimed that the social standard has been practically cut in half under this government--things look that bad when you use the extreme kind of statements Hardy Hansen does. The truth is that social and health care spending together rose by 21 billion kroner in current prices, or 1.6 billion kroner in fixed prices. Personnel numbers rose as well.

Here is another example. We and the Radical Liberals have been showered with invective because we want to make some changes in unemployment insurance--with the emphasis on insurance. It must make an impression on everyone, even members of the union movement, that a quarter of Danish families have a household income of over 250,000 kroner a year because one worker receives compensation and that only 6 percent of our compensation payments of 25 billion kroner goes to those we call the weakest in our society.

[Question] How do you feel when Hardy Hansen says that "the government's policy is an expression of cynical barbarism" and your predecessor, Anker Jorgensen, says that you have "had so much success" that you have "become arrogant and superior toward the wage earners"?

[Answer] I regard them as expressions of destitution and weakness. The weaker, the more destitute they are, the stronger the language. That is a universal experience.

[Question] When the government was formed, you said that now it would be easier to be a Dane. Do you think it has become easier to be a Dane--even for the unemployed?

[Answer] The unemployed have not become better off economically under this government. The gap between the compensation one receives when one is out of work and the wages one receives when one is employed is greater now than it was 2 years ago. But that was also our intention. We want to preserve the world's best unemployment insurance--and it will continue to be the best after we implement our compensation reforms--but we cannot approve of a system where every other compensation recipient gets more support than the wages in the general low-wage sectors. We must find a balance that is both socially correct and psychologically wise.

While I will admit that in an economic sense it has not become easier to be unemployed, I also think that it is no longer so hopeless to be out of work. I am sure that most of the jobless today realize that if the government is allowed to continue with the economic restoration, it is much more likely today that a job is on the way than it was 2 or 3 years ago.

[Question] What has been the best thing and what has been the most disappointing in the last few years?

#### Joys and Disappointments

[Answer] My greatest joy has been to experience the very trusting cooperation among the government parties. And it has also been encouraging--I am not sure I ought to say this--that I have turned out to be a better prime minister than I thought I would be.

My biggest disappointment has been to encounter parties and organizations who know that we are doing the right thing but who because of their own narrow egotistical interests work against our restoration efforts. It does not surprise me but it irritates me immensely that professional leaders in the



union movement completely fail to acknowledge that our policy--in spite of everything--has produced good results.

[Question] How long will the government stay in office?

[Answer] As long as we can get a majority to back a policy that is substantially better than the one that would be pursued if we resign. And I am not unaware of the fact that this could be a long period of time. The four-leaf-clover government will not be just a parenthesis in the history of Denmark.

[Question] A long period of time--is that this election period and another one after that?

[Answer] I do not consider that unlikely.

[Question] How long will you yourself stay in power?

[Answer] As long as I have the energy and the health and a reasonable amount of enthusiasm and psychic power to put into the job. So far I have not noticed any tendency to run down. On the contrary, every morning I look forward with great enthusiasm to the hard work ahead of me that day. But it is a heavy task to be the bottleneck that everything has to pass through ultimately.

[Question] Are you afraid you will be criticized at the national council meeting this weekend because you did not use the government formation last summer to appoint two, three or four new Conservative ministers?

[Answer] We will probably encounter objective and justified criticism for things we have done. Not everything has worked out perfectly. But with respect to the composition of the government, I do not anticipate any criticism at all. On the contrary, most people in my party understand that it is important--and smart--that we do not arrange the composition of the government in such a way that the number of ministers from each of the four parties always has to be in exact mathematical proportion to the number of seats we have.

[Question] Do you think your party can maintain the roughly one-fourth of the votes that it got in the January election, which has been sustained in all the opinion polls taken since then?

[Answer] Yes, because the gains have been so stable. I both hope and believe that we can maintain our share of the voters--while at the same time the other three government parties gain support.

[Question] Did you think 10 years ago when you took over as leader of the Conservative Party that today you would be prime minister and that your party would have 42 seats in Folketing?

## Unrealistic Fantasy

[Answer] No and if someone had told me then that this would be the case, I would have regarded it as a totally unrealistic fantasy.

[Question] Is it to the party's credit or to your own that things have gone so well?

[Answer] We should probably both get some of the credit, but it should go primarily to the party because...let me mention a few key words that may explain why we have acquired so many new voters and thus greater influence as well: naturalness, sincerity...well it sounds banal, but it is my opinion that it has been of decisive importance that the voters trust the Conservative Party.

[Question] From 1974 to 1982 you advocated a merger of your own party and the Liberal Party and later you urged the formation of a broad coalition government with Social Democratic participation. Have you now--with the formation of the four-leaf-clover government--abandoned these untraditional ideas?

[Answer] I would have to say yes. The proposal to merge the Conservatives and the Liberals was made because it would have ended once and for all dissension and discord between the big nonsocialist parties. That is no longer necessary. Now we cooperate in an exemplary way and--I must also admit--most people in the Liberal Party as well as my own have been against the proposal all along.

The idea of a coalition government was an offer--right after the oil crisis that hit Denmark so hard--to put our forces together to counter the threat to our prosperity. Since it didn't work in the 1970's, because the Social Democrats did not dare--and perhaps did not even want to go along, it is probably impossible. But things are going quite well with the four-leaf-clover government and the cooperation we have had from the Radical Liberals.

[Question] Have you totally given up the idea of getting together with the Social Democrats--for example to form a broad compromise on a reform of unemployment insurance and/or to restore agreement on Denmark's security policy?

[Answer] With respect to security policy, I think agreement will be restored in time. The Social Democratic Party is in the middle of a very difficult clarification process--it paddles in one direction one week and in the other the next. It is not easy for them--I am almost sorry for them. But I am positive that the end result will be very bad for the Social Democrats if they escalate matters--in other words if they sow doubt on our membership in NATO. All responsible Social Democrats know how important it is that the Social Democratic views on a Nordic nuclear-free zone, the missile discussion, etc. are not construed in such a way as to make our NATO membership difficult or perhaps even impossible.

[Question] What about unemployment insurance?

[Answer] If the Social Democrats will accept the substitution of a training offer for the second job offer and the setting of a time limit on how long a person can receive compensation, we can talk together about a reform of unemployment insurance. But--frankly--I think it is hopeless to try to get a dialogue going with the Social Democrats on this particular issue.

#### Painless Contract Renewal

Although there is no prospect of an understanding between the government and the labor movement on so important a question as unemployment insurance, the prime minister expects a painless contract renewal in the spring.

"It went easily in 1983 and it will go even more smoothly in the spring," said Poul Schluter, who quickly added:

"I mean that seriously. I can see that you also have doubts. I do not. Most wage earners know and realize that we did the right thing in 1983, that the tight income policy is the prerequisite for economic growth and that the recovery must continue."

#### Replies to Labor's Strike Threat

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Nov 84 p 10

[Article by Dan Axel and Svend Bie]

[Text] The Danish people have more confidence in democracy than in organizational power, said Prime Minister Poul Schluter in a harsh attack on the "Social Democratic labor movement."

The "Social Democratic labor movement" will not succeed in forcing the government and Folketing to go along with it by threatening to shut down the whole country.

So said Prime Minister Poul Schluter yesterday to the 66th national council of the Conservative Party which met in Arhus this weekend.

"This will fail. The Danish people will not tolerate this, no matter how many tens of millions some powerful organization chairmen spend out of compulsory membership dues on whole-page advertisements," he said.

Poul Schluter commented on the latest statements from both SiD [Semiskilled Workers' Union] chairman Hardy Hansen and Knud Heinesen (Social Democrat).

"They will not succeed in putting democracy out of action with their capital power. Their members are also party voters. We can be quite sure that the people have more confidence in and love for democracy than for Danish organizational power," said Poul Schluter, who called the union movement's current newspaper ads misleading and absurd.



The prime minister also stressed that the Conservative Party has become a real "people's party." More semiskilled workers vote for the Conservative Party than for the Socialist People's Party. And the Conservatives look for votes from blue-collar workers and office workers almost as much as the Social Democrats do, the prime minister added.

With regard to social spending, Poul Schluter said that the fact is that spending on the social and health care sector is higher today in terms of real value than in 1981.

"And there are no fewer people working in the social and health sector either. There are more," said the prime minister who said that a statement that the government "has bombed the country back into the Middle Ages" shows the need for improving the teaching of history.

#### Income Policy for the Workers' Sake

"We are not pursuing income policy for my sake or for the sake of the Conservative Party or the government. We are primarily pursuing income policy for the sake of the workers. For that is the only way to guarantee the creation of new jobs and the reduction of unemployment," said Poul Schluter, who promised that "if what is so awkwardly called the 'Social Democratic labor movement' wants to wreck our society and our democracy, the Conservative Party is prepared to defend our society and our democracy."

#### Pledges Effort for 'Zone'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Nov 84 p 10

[Article by Dan Axel and Svend Bie]

[Text] Ole Bernt Henriksen sharply criticized Danish Radio for its inadequate coverage of the Folketing security debate.

The Conservative Party is prepared to support the establishment of nuclear-free zones if they can be set up on the basis of reliable guarantees and treaties between the Warsaw Pact lands and NATO countries.

This was stressed by re-elected national chairman Poul Schluter in Aarhus yesterday, where he even made use of a Social Democratic turn of phrase when he promised to "work as actively as possible for these zones."

Ole Bernt Henriksen was less kind in his criticism of the Social Democratic resolution chaos in the area of security policy in the last 2 years, but he was satisfied with the outcome of the debate in Folketing on Thursday.

He said that the fear of "isolation along with Anker Jorgensen's ravings and Lasse Budtz' amateur foreign policy activities in Copenhagen and Moscow have

led a majority of the Social Democratic Folketing group to react strongly against Anker Jorgensen, Lasse Budtz and the Social Democratic peace sisters."

Ole Bernt Henriksen also directed sharp criticism at Danish Radio, which he said had largely ignored the "first Folketing foreign policy debate which clearly ended in the government's favor."

Poul Schluter was also very satisfied that the Social Democrats have now indicated clearly that Denmark will not take unilateral steps in NATO to achieve a reduction of the nuclear weapons arsenal.

"This is important. But it is even more important that we also make sure that this NATO membership has a real content and guarantees that we do not become a defense vacuum," said Poul Schluter to the 1,516 delegates and 800 guests in Vejlbj-Riiskov Hall in Aarhus.

#### Paper Praises Schluter, Government

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Nov 84 p 16

[Editorial: "The Right Party"]

[Text] Poul Schluter said--with the astonishing frankness that is characteristic of him--that he has turned out to be a better prime minister than he thought he would be. Many in his own party and even more outside it would probably say the same thing. Not many people believed 10 years ago that it would be the lot of the somewhat run-down newly-elected party chairman to lead the Conservative Party to the restoration of its former strength. Even 2 years ago, when the government was being formed, people had such reservations about him that he almost missed becoming prime minister. But today Schluter is a government leader with authority at Christiansborg and popularity among the people. And the Conservative national council will distinguish itself honorably and responsibly while it rejoices that everything is going so well for the party.

Since the last national council meeting the government has won an election and the four-leaf clover government that had foreseen that it could soon wither has adjusted itself to a tenure that could last a long time. The Social Democrats, who led the country into the crisis, have played their opposition role so poorly that they have provided the government with better conditions. The virulent campaign the union movement has started against the government's policy could anchor the Social Democrats in an isolation that further reduces their maneuverability. It is unusual to see a party that builds barricades on the path that would lead it back to power.

The prime minister's personal qualities have been a big help. Equally important--and few people would dispute this--is the fact that the Conservative Party was the right party to bring about cooperation among the government

parties and between them and the Radical Liberals. Who really believes that the Liberals, who with government responsibility pursued the crisis policy alone and in cooperation with the Social Democrats, would have had the same strength in leading this cooperation? The Conservative Party was the party that could carry an economic policy that meant drastic measures, cuts and rearrangements and provided the background for indignant accusations concerning social cuts and approaching poverty. It could do so because its conservatism has never had the reactionary right-wing stamp its most indignant opponents have tried to attach to it. It is the right party because it has been able to confirm what it has always wanted to be: a people's party in the middle that is good at mediation and building bridges.

#### Election If NATO Membership Undermined

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Nov 84 p 6

[Article by Dan Axel and Svend Bie]

[Excerpts] The head of the four-party government coalition, Poul Schluter, has no doubts at all--a Folketing election will be called the minute a resolution is passed that would mean that Denmark is no longer a real member of NATO.

He made that clear in his closing remarks yesterday to the Conservative Party national council meeting in Aarhus.

"The day can come where an election based on a foreign policy issue is necessary," said Poul Schluter. "We will be assuming an incredible responsibility, but we will do it if NATO membership is jeopardized."

But the prime minister emphasized that as soon as the Dyvig report has been published, the government will invite the Social Democrats to participate in new talks on security policy. "And we hope that it will then be possible to finally defuse this issue," he said.

6578

CSO: 3613/29

## PAPER COMMENTS ON SCHLUTER VISIT TO SWEDEN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Nov 84 p 11

[Editorial: "Visit to Sweden"]

[Text] Prime Minister Poul Schluter's visit to Sweden took place on the favorable background of the conclusion of the disputes about Hessel Island. The Hessel Island affair dispute never became anything more than a picturesque curl in the otherwise smooth relations between the two countries, but just the same it is good that the matter has been closed.

An official visit is often more show than content. But the Danish and Swedish prime ministers had at this opportunity -- as they often have -- more than just polite phrases to share with one another. During the visit two main themes were touched upon: economic cooperation in the North and the security policy situation.

Economic cooperation between the Nordic countries is an old chessnut. Gigantic plans have been made, and beginnings have been laid out for daily, concrete cooperation across the borders. The gigantic plans were recently examined when Hilmar Baunsgaard tried a NORDEK solution during his time as prime minister.

Since then, the economic conditions in Europe have changed significantly, and today there is no possibility of creating a Nordic alternative to the Common Market or to Danish membership in the Common Market. Economic cooperation must therefore develop in agreement with this situation. Danish trade with Sweden and Norway continues to operate at a high level, and it will be in the interest of all the trading countries if the so-called Nordic home market has the best possible conditions for thriving. If the prime minister's visit in Sweden contributed to the furtherance of such efforts, the visit was of great value.

In the field of security policy, the starting point is the same as for the economic area. Sweden is neutral, and Denmark is a member of NATO. There is no Nordic alternative in the security policy force structure. As far as the North as a nuclear weapon free zone is concerned, there are therefore interests that unite and interests that divide. Denmark must respect its alliance membership in order to benefit from the protection in it. Sweden must carry out a security

policy that respects neutrality and that therefore also maintains it. The common point is that both countries are actively working for a peaceful world, and that both countries want to reduce the nuclear threat in Europe. But it is a long way from this common interest to the point where the two countries make common initiatives. On the other hand, it is less far to the conclusion that Sweden is quite satisfied that both Norway and Denmark are members of NATO with the backing that this gives Swedish security policy.

These matters the two prime ministers have had on the agenda for their meeting, not for dramatic exchanges of opinions, but for mutual orientation and consideration. And it is also worth noting that Olof Palme is now the last guardian of the long Social Democratic government tradition in the North. Next year is election year in Sweden, and there are many indications that there will be a nonsocialist victory with the not unlikely effect that the next Swedish prime minister will be conservative -- as in Norway and in Denmark.

9124

CSO: 3613/35

## CONSERVATIVE PARTY IS BIGGEST LOSER IN POLL

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by Solveig Rødsgaard]

[Text] Political Index

Question: Which party would you vote for if  
an election to the Folketing were  
to take place tomorrow?

Period during which poll was taken: 13 October - 28 October 1984	10 Jan 1984	May 1984	June 1984	Aug 1984	Sep 1984	Oct 1984
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Social Democratic Party	31.6	32.2	31.1	33.1	32.1	32.1
Radical Liberal Party	5.5	5.8	5.3	5.1	5.3	4.9
Conservative Party	23.4	24.5	23.5	24.5	25.7	24.4
Single-Tax Party	1.5	-	-	-	-	-
Socialist People's Party	11.5	12.1	13.9	12.0	12.7	12.1
Inter.Soc. Workers' Party	0.1	-	-	-	-	-
Communist Party	0.7	-	-	-	-	-
Center Democrats	4.6	4.2	4.2	4.1	3.3	4.2
Christian People's Party	2.7	2.3	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.4
Liberal Party	12.1	12.2	11.7	11.9	11.5	11.5
Left-Socialist Party	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.1	2.5	2.1
Progressive Party	3.6	2.3	2.6	2.4	2.6	3.8
Other Parties*)	-	2.0	2.4	2.2	1.9	2.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

\*) Parties with less than 2 percent of the vote.

Reprinting subject to indication of the Gallup Institute and BERLINGSKE  
TIDENDE as sources.



## Radical Liberal Party Lost Voters on Budget Agreement

The budget agreement between the government and the Radical Liberal Party has not caused enthusiasm among Radical Liberal voters. Today, the party has the lowest support among the electorate since the elections to the Folketing last January. This appears from the most recent political poll taken by the Gallup Institute during the period from 13 to 28 October.

The Conservative Party has also lost votes compared to the poll in September, but the party is still above the result of the January elections. The Liberal Party, the Center Democrats and the Christian People's Party today have fewer supporters than in the elections to the Folketing, while the Center Democrats have advanced compared to the September poll. It is, moreover, worth noting that the Progressive Party is now for the first time above the election result nearly 10 months ago.

The Social Democratic Party has the same support among the voters as in September, which is above the election result. The Socialist People's Party has declined this time but still has more supporters than last January.

The part of the budget agreement which in particular has created a stir among Radical Liberal voters is the agreement on job creation, under which job offers will be replaced by offers of education, and according to which long-term unemployed after 5 years risk getting on welfare.

On the basis of the figures of the Gallup poll, BERLINGSKE TIDENDE's Sunday edition has calculated the distribution of seats in the Folketing, based on 175 seats. The two seats from the Faroes and the two from Greenland, however, have not been included.

	GALLUP POLL	NOW
Social Democratic Party .....	57	56
Radical Liberal Party .....	9	10
Conservative Party .....	44	42
Socialist People's Party .....	22	21
Center Democrats .....	7	8
Christian People's Party .....	4	5
Liberal Party .....	21	22
Left-Socialist Party .....	4	5
Progressive Party .....	7	5
Free Democrats .....	0	1.

7262

CSO: 3613/30



## DETAILS REVEALED ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS WITH LIBYA ON CHAD

## Estier Report

Paris L'UNITE in French 21 Sep 84 pp 2-3

[Article by Claude Estier: "How the Cheysson-Qadhafi Accord Was Concluded "]

[Text] After agreeing to the simultaneous withdrawal of his troops and the French forces from Chad, the Libyan colonel is turning toward France. Why not take him at his word?

"They're leaving, we're leaving. They're returning, we're returning." This concise way Claude Cheysson has of putting it effectively sums up the significance of the accord concluded Sunday in Tripoli and which itself ends a 13-month stalemate between France and Colonel Qadhafi. "A new era is beginning in relations between our two countries," he said Tuesday during the French Television Channel 1 program, "History on [Channel] 1," which showed an amiable and smiling "guide of the revolution" who did not hesitate to pay tribute to Francois Mitterrand's "courage" and to "France's independence, which can be profitable for peace and cooperation, especially in the area surrounding the Mediterranean."

This almost warm Qadhafi was, nevertheless, the same one who a few weeks ago promised France a defeat in Chad "worse than its defeat at Dien Bien Phu." The incoherence of a man who for 15 years has gotten the world used to the most contradictory of initiatives? A reversal dictated by a more realistic evaluation of the situation? To answer these two questions and others the French public has the right to ask, we must first go back to the slow progress that has led to this decision for the total and concomitant withdrawal of the French and Libyan forces that have been deployed from Chad.

## The First Moves

Everything started last February during the minister of foreign relations' first trip to Tripoli, which gave rise to ironic or caustic commentaries, especially by the French opposition, such that the meeting between Qadhafi and Claude Cheysson seemed to end in a fiasco. We know today that this was not the case. On that day, in fact and for the first time, the colonel had upheld the principle expressed by Francois Mitterrand in September 1983 before the UN

General Assembly of a simultaneous withdrawal of the French and Libyan forces from Chad. At the same time and also for the first time, he acknowledged their presence under Goukouni Oueddei, a fact he had until then denied. But at that time Qadhafi had imposed a prior condition that was unacceptable for France, to wit, the departure of Hissein Habre and the installation of a new chief of state at N'Djamena.

Therefore, nothing conclusive, but the first moves had been made and, moreover, Qadhafi had declared that he was ready to continue the conversation. It was actually pursued by intermediary emissaries. Each in turn, the secretary general of the French Foreign Office and the director of the Middle East Department, a close collaborator of Claude Cheysson, went to Tripoli to meet with Libyan officials. Matters were progressing slowly, but there was constant contact. During that same period the phone was also in operation between Paris and Tripoli: on several occasions, on the initiative of one or the other party, details were requested on this or that movement of troops or this or that arrival of equipment spotted on one side or another of the famous "red line" that separated the French forces of "Operation Manta" from those of Goukouni's GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] with their Libyan support forces.

On 10 May an important step was taken with the publication in LE MONDE of an interview granted Eric Rouleau by Qadhafi, in which he finally publicly rallied to the idea of a simultaneous withdrawal, an idea which he had mentioned a few days before in a confidential message to Francois Mitterrand conveyed by Austrian ex-Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. Could an accord have been concluded at that time? They say yes today in Tripoli, but at the time in Paris they felt that the time was not yet "ripe" and that any premature initiative would run the risk of failure fraught with consequences. Thus it was not until early July, when the French Government was informed from another source of the preparation of an alliance pact between Morocco and Libya, that the minister of foreign relations in close agreement with the president actively reactivated the matter. At the end of August, taking advantage of the occasion of the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the Libyan Revolution, Francois Mitterrand and Claude Cheysson decided to send to Tripoli the bearer of a special message, a high-level expert in the person of Guy Georgy, a former ambassador to Libya, Iran and Algeria. He met with several high officials, including Commander Jaloud, the number-two man in Libya, but, contrary to what was hoped for, he was not received by Colonel Qadhafi and returned to Paris on 4 September with nothing more than an indication that a reply to the president's message would be made in 3 or 4 weeks.

#### Secret Trip

The reply did in fact arrive less than 10 days later: Last Thursday, 13 September, Claude Cheysson received a message from his Libyan counterpart, Ali Triki, announcing to him that Colonel Qadhafi was ready to see him. Cheysson immediately replied: "I'll come when you like." A new message from Tripoli Friday afternoon: "Colonel Qadhafi will receive you on Saturday at 1730 hours."

At that time the whole problem was to keep the trip secret since a premature leak might have jeopardized the whole thing. So an airplane the GLAM [expansion

unknown] flew Claude Cheysson there accompanied by only one of his collaborators, Bruno Delays, who had already made the trip to Tripoli with him the first time. At 1800 hours he was received by a most amiable Qadhafi who declared himself to be ready for the simultaneous withdrawal, adding that they could even have accomplished it before then. There followed a discussion over the dates of the withdrawal, the French proposing from 21 September to 20 October while the Libyans preferred from the end of October to the end of December. At one point Cheysson, intrigued, saw Qadhafi leave the room without saying a word, leaving him all alone with Ali Triki. But he returned a moment later, having absented himself only long enough for a prayer.

#### The Effect of a Thunderbolt

Since the discussion over the dates as well as over other related matters was a protracted one, Claude Cheysson decided to return to Paris that night to consult the president and the prime minister. Late Sunday morning he left for Tripoli again. A few hours later, agreement was reached over the dates — 45 days counting from 25 September — the system for maintaining surveillance over the withdrawal from mobile posts composed of small units provided by two African countries — with Senegal being chosen by France — and the installation of a small Franco-Libyan mixed commission in neighboring Nigeria. It was agreed that they would, moreover, "work" for the departure of the contingent of 2,000 Zairians who are supporting Hissene Habre's forces. A question that was raised this week on the occasion of President Mobutu's visit to Paris.

It was up to Claude Cheysson and Ali Triki to edit what is not a legal text, but an inventory of joint decisions summed up in the communique which, published simultaneously in Paris and in Tripoli late Monday morning, produced the effect of a thunderbolt, all the more so since, obviously indispensable to the success of the undertaking, the famous secret had been miraculously kept by both parties right up to the last minute.

The news of this Franco-Libyan agreement was immediately received with keen satisfaction everywhere in the world except perhaps in Washington, where it appears they did not appreciate the fact that the French Government did not consult the United States beforehand — but why would it have? In Chad itself, while Goukouni Oueddei's partisans expressed their satisfaction, Hissene Habre did not conceal his bitterness at not having been associated with the negotiations. Charles Hernu, who met with him on Monday morning in N'Djamena an hour before the publication of the Franco-Libyan communique, however, reminded him that France had only intervened in Chad at his request in August 1983 to deal with a Libyan attack and that it had always been understood that it would withdraw as soon as the Libyans themselves agreed to withdraw. This decision, therefore, in no way lays open to question French cooperation with the legal government in Chad, which continues to be that of Hissene Habre. They could, moreover, note that Colonel Qadhafi no longer questions this. Asked about this during the Channel 1 program, he avoided any allusion to Chad's internal situation.

French public opinion naturally reacted positively to what obviously appeared to be a great success of the policy pursued by the president and French

diplomacy. Without engaging in useless debate, this success deserves to be underlined for the benefit of those — there were a certain number in the opposition — who criticized the French Government for not having attacked Libya directly — which would have dragged us into a war with that country, one with unforeseeable consequences — and who a few days ago were still claiming — like Bernard Pons — that Francois Mitterrand had gotten bogged down in the sands of Chad. There is no doubt today that it is the efficacy of the Manta military deployment, even if it was costly, that blocked the ambitions of Colonel Qadhafi.

The first French emissary to Tripoli, Roland Dumas, had tried to convince him as early as last summer. It took him several months to realize that any new advance on his part would expose him to a crushing counterattack and that because of this he was in a deadlock in which, contrary to appearances, time would be working more against him (gradual dissociation of the GUNT, difficulties in supplying his troops deployed in Northern Chad, beginning of a revolt among them, political agitation in Libya itself, etc.) than against France, whose military deployment was solid and could remain in position for as long as was necessary.

#### What Guarantees?

The question we may obviously raise is: What guarantees does France have that Libya will in fact apply the terms of last Sunday's agreement and not, after a tactical withdrawal, attempt to return to Chad as it has already done in the past? I had an opportunity to ask Colonel Qadhafi this question myself Tuesday evening during the Channel 1 telecast. His answer was interesting. After insisting on substantive guarantees — the surveillance arrangements provided for in the agreement — he insisted on what he called "moral guarantees," which he specifically linked with the expression of his desire to turn a new page in his relations with France. We may, of course, doubt the sincerity of a man who has changed his behavior so often, but even if the coherence of his thinking is often difficult to grasp, Colonel Qadhafi is certainly not a fool. For a while his ambitions in Chad were encouraged by a certain laxity of the French administrations of the time, which allowed him to get as far as N'Djamena. But this time he has no doubt realized that France was able to blend caution with determination, that he was throwing himself against an unsurmountable wall and that any new initiative on his part would today instantly — a few hours would suffice — restore the French military disposition to perfect operational order.

Since, no doubt under the pressure of events which he has been unable to completely control, Colonel Qadhafi is today turning toward France, why not take him at his word? Why not suppose that he has in this affair rediscovered his affiliation — which he often claims — with Nasser, who shortly before his death and having undergone the unfortunate experience of his relations with the two superpowers had recommended to him that he seek an alliance with France? No doubt it would be appropriate for us to explore this new course of action with the greatest of caution, if only because of our good relations with the other countries of Arab North Africa, in particular Algeria, which looks askance at everything that comes from Qadhafi. In connection with this, a



summit meeting such as the one the colonel hoped for on Tuesday evening is perhaps premature. But what has just happened in Tripoli, aside from the military disengagement from Chad, which in itself already constitutes a particularly successful outcome, might well in this explosive region, the Mediterranean Basin, be the beginning of a redealing of the cards in which France would not necessarily have the worst hand.

#### Secret Meeting

Paris MAGAZINE HEBDO in French 21 Sep 84 p 23

[Article by Claude Jacquemart: "Agreement Was Really Negotiated at Ifrane"]

[Text] It was certainly not the first meeting between Francois Mitterrand and King Hassan II. But it was not an ordinary meeting at Ifrane last 30 August: Qadhafi was indeed present. Despite the Libyan chief of state's verbal outbursts, it was really there that Chad's fate was to be sealed. Only one man had not been advised of it: Hissein Habre!

Everything was accomplished within a month, behind a smoke screen. Between three men: Francois Mitterrand, Moroccan King Hassan II and Colonel Qadhafi. With one major absence, not casually faced with the fait accompli: Chadian President Hissein Habre.

The affair began on 13 August. A treaty signed in Oujda on Moroccan soil instituted a "union of states" between Morocco and Libya. What does this accord say? Actually, it matters little. In the past similar treaties between Qadhafi and his neighbors (Egypt, Tunisia) rapidly revealed themselves to be dead letters.

But Francois Mitterrand had spotted an opportunity in this case. Could not the king of Morocco play the mediator in the strange conflict that for months had the French Army and Libyan troops glaring at each other in the Chadian desert? The French president called on the Foreign Office to participate: Minister of Foreign Relations Claude Cheysson was to officially play the minor roles in the drama in the North African capitals. At the same time Francois Mitterrand mobilized his personal advisers: Roland Dumas, whose rank of minister of European affairs has not spared him from accomplishing many missions on behalf of the president, Jacques Attali and Francois de Grossouvre. Also needed were the "African," Guy Penne, and Guy Georgy, France's former ambassador to Libya and Algeria, known particularly for the intermediary role he played in Giscard d'Estaing's time in the attempts made to free ethnologist Francoise Claustre, who was being held hostage by future President Habre.

The big scene was to be played in Morocco, at Ifrane in the Middle Atlas where, on 30 August, supposedly on a "private visit" and accompanied by Francois Grossouvre and the latter's wife, Francois Mitterrand joined King Hassan II. Did he on that occasion meet with Colonel Qadhafi? Alerted by its correspondent, Alain Sanders, a French daily, PRESENT, affirmed the fact on 12 September.

Sanders' account: "At first, everything was going well. Qadhafi was talkative, almost polite. And then, very quickly, things were spoiled as concerns Chad. When Mitterrand solicited a gesture of good will on the part of the Libyan troops stationed in Chad (a symbolic withdrawal of at least a few dozen km), Qadhafi exploded and launched — before the eyes of a more than embarrassed Hassan II — into a long anti-French tirade the upshot of which was that France is "a colonialist, imperialist country" for whose soldiers "a defeat worse than that of Dien Bien Phu" lies in store. For good measure, he added that he would support Goukouni Oueddei to the death. With an impenetrable expression on his face, Mitterrand rose. The discussion was over."

The French chief of state then effected a strategic withdrawal to Portugal. A pretext: in order not to be in Morocco during the referendum designed to ratify the treaty of union with Libya. But on 31 August he was back in Ifrane, which Qadhafi had left. The situation seemed to be stymied. So much so that on 1 September, for the 15th anniversary of the Libyan Revolution, Qadhafi again promised France — this time publicly — to inflict on it a Dien Bien Phu on the sands of Chad. On 4 September Guy Georgy interceded with Libyan Prime Minister Abdesselam Jalloud. In vain.

The situation was resolved last week. On Thursday, 13 September, Claude Cheysson was invited to Tripoli. On Saturday he conversed with Qadhafi. At one point the Libyan colonel interrupted him, for the time it takes to make a prayer in the direction of Mecca. Cheysson returned on Sunday, reported, left for Libya again and returned that night. And Monday there was a communique from the Foreign Office announcing "the total and concomitant evacuation from Chad of the French Armed Forces and Libyan elements supporting the GUNT (Goukouni's forces) as well as of all of their respective arms and equipment."

At the same moment, in N'Djamena French Minister of Defense Charles Hernu played the role of consoler to Hissein Habre, who had to the end been kept out of a negotiation about which Goukouni appears to have been informed. The bitter commentary of the Chadian minister of foreign affairs: "What we do not understand is that we were not advised as to what was being hatched when we were the ones who had asked our French friends to help us and defend us." But everything that transpired between the Florentine of Paris and the one French Television Channel 1 christened the "Machiavelli of the desert" on Tuesday evening had to be kept secret right to the end.

11,466

CSO: 3519/77

## PAPANDREOU'S FAMILY BACKGROUND SEEN SHAPING POLITICAL PERSONALITY

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 30 Oct 84 p 8

[Article by Titos Athanasiadis: "Papandreou's Polish 'Syndrome'"]

[Excerpts] Papandreou's pro-Polish attitude can be explained. A political scientist who bases his estimates on psychology as well, a political psychologist, can interpret Papandreou's pro-Polish (pro-socialist) recent adventure in Poland.

The absence of family life in childhood and young adulthood, as well as its weakness, can produce anarchic or autocratic characters, individuals such as revolutionaries or, conversely, dictators. Democratic characters are only created within families who lead a normal life. On this subject, the conclusions drawn by political scientists and political psychologists are definitive.

Like other politicians, like all people, Papandreou cannot evade this law. Doubtless, the fact that his father was Greek, his mother Greek-Polish, his maternal grandfather a genuine Pole, the fact that he was born in Khios, was brought up in Athens, but Patra was ever-present in family discussions, the fact that he spent his structural and creative years in the United States, where he married twice--first a compatriot and then an American--influenced his life and formed his character.

His father's separation from his mother because of his love affair with the actress Kyveli also played a decisive role in shaping his psyche and his personality. At the time, Andreas was four (he was born in 1919); this means that he spent his youngest years without his father and mother living together under the same roof. Until he was 20, when he had to leave for the United States in order to avoid problems with the Metaxas dictatorship as an... anarchist and a Marxist, he lived only with his mother. It was not until 6 years later, after the war, that his mother went to live with him in the United States. She remained with him until her death in 1981. As a result, he was one of those children who, due to their parents' divorce, takes the side of the mother, for whom Andreas--justifiably so--always had limitless love and devotion. In the same way, she showed her love for her son by remaining alone for the rest of her life, faithful to the father of her only child.



In remembrance of this sensitive and especially tender relationship, Andreas named his first daughter after his mother, Sophia. The depth of his affection for his mother and of her influence over him is attested to by those who had close relations with them.

There is no question that, under the influence of such psychological and social factors, Andreas Papandreou developed a split personality, whose causes are: his parents' separation, his stay in various countries, his two marriages, his watching from afar the successes and the rise of his father (when Giorgos Papandreou first became prime minister in 1944, Andreas was in the United States). Furthermore, even his father Giorgos had a split personality. In his book "My Darling Sophia..." Freddy Germanos refers to the love letters written by Giorgos Papandreou to Sophia Mineiko and states: "Deep down, [he] has a split personality, as he will perhaps have for the rest of his life."

However, Andreas' psyche is not only influenced by external factors. There are also inherited traits that contribute to the shaping of his personality.

His father, Giorgos Papandreou, was both a politician and an "actor," as well as a revolutionary (he was imprisoned as a student and persecuted as a politician). His grandfather Mineiko was a Polish general who had fought in Garibaldi's army in Italy in his younger years. Andreas inherited from the former the political mutations that characterize his behavior. From the latter, he inherited his revolutionary explosiveness and the autocratic behavior that owed so much to the Prussian militaristic spirit (Mineiko's autocratic tendencies expressed themselves even in his private life).

Sophia Papandreou's stories to Andreas about her father, a Prussian officer who joined the revolutions of other countries, about Poland which, until 1918 was under the yoke of the Russian czars and whose territorial integrity and national independence had been violated for centuries, surely contributed to the shaping, not only of his character, but also of his revolutionary beliefs, which become increasingly deeper with his Marxist studies. Thus, the revolutionary prejudice, the autocratic mentality, the disorder of his education and the polyethnic moulding and internationalist experience of Andreas Papandreou finally led to the shaping of his revolutionary, socialist and autocratic political character.

Andreas' Polish "syndrome" played a decisive role in shaping his personality as it is known to us today.

CSO: 3521/78

## PAPER VIEWS CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING OPENING OF PLO OFFICE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Nov 84 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Should the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO] be allowed to set up an information office in Norway? The issue has aroused controversy, as might be expected, and the dispute extends into the government. Cabinet Minister Kare Kristiansen has called upon his colleague the minister of justice to deny permits for Palestinian spokesmen to remain in our country. He thinks if such an office is to be allowed, it certainly should not be staffed by Palestinians, but by Norwegians. The doubts about the attitude of our authorities were, however, resolved after a press secretary from the Office of the Prime Minister, Permanent Secretary Arne Skauge, issued a statement saying that the government leadership had no objections in principle to PLO representation in Oslo.

In addition to Cabinet Minister Kristiansen, objections to a PLO office have also been raised by spokesmen for individual Christian organizations, the Jewish community in Norway and the Progressive Party. The basis for the protests is, on the one hand, that the PLO has been involved in terrorist activities and, on the other, that the organization does not recognize the State of Israel.

Arne Skauge announced the government's conditions for a PLO office: the Palestinian representatives may expect to obtain permission to reside in Norway provided that they have not been involved in terrorist activities, but they cannot be granted diplomatic or official status. Under the prevailing circumstances, this may be a reasonable position to take. The PLO is the spokesman for an important population group in one of the world's hot spots, and has the right to present its views in our country. In this connection it should be pointed out that today Norway is one of the very few Western countries which does not have a PLO office already. On the other hand, from the official Norwegian point of view it is not a matter of course to grant the PLO diplomatic status since the organization does not represent an established government.

We are well aware that a PLO office in Oslo will have its drawbacks. With such a controversial organization, which is associated with such a violent

part of the world, there is the risk of creating tremendous problems. An example of this was noted when one of our more eccentric countrymen recently made a statement in the press that he had taken steps to blow up the planned PLO office. Hesitations about criminal matters should not, however, prevent us as a nation from attempting to listen to both sides of the Middle East conflict as carefully as we can. Both sides have the right to state their cases.

As regards the man whom the PLO has picked to head the office in Oslo, Mr Abdul-Rahman Alawi, we do not hold him responsible for previous Palestinian terrorist activities in which it has not been proven that he was involved, just as we do not blame the Israeli ambassador for the Lillehammer murder several years ago. It cannot be illegal for either Palestinians or Jewish Israelis to work for their nation's cause, but the prerequisite is, of course, that this must be done peacefully and lawfully.

CSO: 3639/35

## COMMENT ASSESSES 'STATE OF NATION' PRIOR TO DEBATE

Madrid YA in Spanish 21 Oct 84 pp 5-6

[Editorial]

[Text] What is the state of Spain now? This formidable question, as strictly posed by competent and patriotic individuals, should seemingly be the focus of the interest of the entire nation. Apparently this is a subject which will be discussed in the Congress of Deputies, and no one can doubt that the parliamentarians who will participate in the discussion are competent and patriotic. However, prior to the so-called "debate on the state of the nation," a previous consideration should be contemplated. Although the document sent by the government as a basis for it is very somber in tone with colorful assertions mixed in, and although perhaps despite the desire of each and every one of the members of this chamber, parliamentary weakness has been the general rule and lively and interesting discussions the exception, it may well happen that everything will come down to a session which is little more than routine. The government with its document did not exactly heighten general attention, the atmosphere did not contribute to it, and only a Herculean effort on the part of the opposition and the cooperation of the government could guarantee an answer to the great questions being asked of the palace on the Carrera de San Jeronimo by the Spanish people.

## Foreign Policy and Defense

The Spanish people see how the government is increasing military expenditures, how the public media have reported the close alliance between Morocco and Libya or the polemic concerning NATO, and the people are asking in chorus how the subjects of defense and foreign policy are being presented set forth in their fatherland. Because it is obvious that the answer to the first question is not the same if we are definitively a part of the defensive framework of the Western world as it would be if we decided to pursue some kind of neutrality, or if we sought some unusual alliance.

In observing the picture in this way, we must confess that following the statement in item 99 of the 100 included in the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] program, urging the achievement of "greater autonomy for Spain, beyond the bloc policy," which would require freezing "negotiations with a view to membership in the NATO military organization" and continued pursuit of a referendum on whether we should belong to that organization, what is certain is that fleeting Third World inclinations have been abandoned and a kind of gradual rapprochement with the Western world has occurred.

It is sad to contemplate the radical disparity between the plans set forth by Minister Moran and Secretary of State Marin, and how naturally, silence prevails in this sector, wherein after an offer of collaboration with the opposition, everything seems to be racing toward an endless sea of electoral concessions, without any followup whatever, and wherein it seems that the government is using the expression mentioned, "state policy," as a kind of refuge in order to emerge unscathed from a dangerous passage. For the phrase "no at any price" continues in effect, but the gloomy progress of the negotiations may hold some unpleasant surprise for us, of which the people of Spain may become fully aware when there is no remedy. To reject the fact that the path to a proper agreement with the EEC is linked with previous and open acceptance of NATO may be not a political error, but a national catastrophe.

The subject of NATO cannot be separated from a policy filled with Third World tendencies which adversely altered the development of events at the Santa Cruz palace and those vacillations along the path which complicated the still-pending issue of relations with Israel, and which in the case of Portugal have converted a friendly administration into one characterized by hesitation, above all after the blundering proposal of parallelism with the Belgium-Luxembourg union.

Only one favorable point. France is providing major aid against terrorist actions by the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group], although one can wonder if this cooperation would be as intensive if the PSOE had not been in power.

#### Economic, Labor and Social Policy

The government policy has three characteristics, linked with three contradictions. The first is the drastic abandonment of the PSOE electoral program. Why insist on something which has reached its peak both in the AES [economic and social agreement] and in the current draft budget law? But the demagogic steps taken to resolve specific crises as happened, just by way of example, with Rumasa, the Catalan Bank and with the banking sector, indicated that the doctrinal change was not a complete one, but rather curiously ambiguous. Formulating an ambiguous economic policy is the best way of ending up in a chaotic situation.

The second characteristic is that in the adjustment policy, there continues to be acceptance of the violence which develops almost spontaneously, without any reaction in the metallurgical and shipyard workers cases other than a confused series of unrelated activities without adequate explanation. By way of background, lacking a modern agrarian policy, lacking a sensible energy policy, lacking an industrial and services policy which would take the new world directions into account, we are pushing the cart of our material advance forward in erratic and contradictory fashion.

The third characteristic is that with public expenditures launched impulsively, which seem to be spiraling out of control toward frightening levels, we have entered into the dangerous world of debt and the effects of the expulsion of private enterprises. Public expenditure is beginning to be self-nurturing simply because of the payment of interest and amortization to the holders of public funds, and it is unimaginable, unless we reverse everything



in the battle against inflation, that the private sector can expand with this colossal abandonment of the "holy fear of deficit" urged for 80 years by Echegaray. Coverage continues thanks to the gigantic surrender of our business affairs to foreign hands. A French minister did not hesitate to state recently that "Spain is up for auction." The question as to whose Spain arises legitimately in view of the fact that no change in policy is seen regarding massive entry into Spain of the multinational companies representing the most dynamic international capitalism.

### Rights and Freedoms

The transition, until 1982, as is very well-known, developed under the banner of substantial expansion of the rights and freedoms of the citizens. But as of this date, retreats and advances are intermingled. It seems that the state control inherent in socialism has been combined in this case with an unconcealed desire to occupy each and every sector of power. Naturally, it is quite possible that this is due to a desire to improve the efficiency of our administration, but the Leviathan monster here has raised its head, and from time to time it also seems to be becoming the Behemoth monster. The examples are multiplying. In news policy, the attitudes are inflexible. In the autonomous bodies, the conflicts are becoming more widespread, doing obvious national damage. The nation needs to be aware that there are regional, statutory, autonomous and local realities whose existence is in jeopardy and which must exercise real power.

For all these reasons, the government has in truth almost never engaged in dialogue. Shall we mention what is happening in the realm of education? Shall we go on to the civil service? And what can be said about the polemic which has developed in the court sector? An effort is being made to impose centralism and state control, and a lack of confidence in the intermediary social groups can be perceived (to go no further, the proposal drafted concerning the vocational secondary schools is involved here), such that the banner of the state has been hoisted against society.

### The Passage of Time

In contemplating what has occurred with the proper perspective in time, a number of definitive traits emerge in what has happened to us. First of all, the arrogance of the early days has been contained. Such spectacular failures as those related to drug abuse and public order, such frustrated prophecies as that pertaining to the 800,000 jobs, problems as badly resolved as that of the state security bodies, threats as obvious as that involving the social security crisis, the decline in the membership and influence of the UGT [General Union of Workers], and the noticeable drop in the popularity of certain government leaders have marked the foreheads of the new administration with enough ashes so that a hint of humility can be glimpsed there.

Moreover, they are bound to cause cracks in the claim that ethics is something inherent in socialism. Now Spaniards would laugh if the PSOE were to embark upon a new campaign to assert its impeccable honesty. In these two years, a real new class, free of the special and utopian interests--right or wrong, but always extensive--of the old fighters for socialism, has emerged.



The much vaunted "moral rearmament" has turned out to be quite the opposite--an alarming disintegration of ethical values, some of a general nature, involving family, life and liberty, and others of a specifically religious nature, which despite the fact that they are a part of the traditional idiosyncrasy of the country, have been attacked in the mass media with notorious frequency.

One should ask if the opposition has played a role in this change in time or not. It has an alibi related to the parliamentary disagreement. But one can legitimately ask if it has been able to work with the dedication Spain's difficult present era requires, and if it has succeeded fully in interpreting the needs of our society and becoming, despite everybody, its spokesman.

#### On Balance

This is not the moment for accepting ridiculous assessments, such as the percentages of unrelated laws submitted and to be submitted to the legislature. It is the time to note, because it can be measured, that the economic stagnation continues and that our society has a poorer standard of living than it did 2 years ago. It should be added that with every passing day, there are fewer incentives for clambering out of the quagmire in which our society is caught. In deprecating the morality of effort, one increases the lassitude which, like the shadow of the manchineel tree, makes everything it touches sterile. We have deteriorated ideologically and morally, because that great civic virtue which is solidarity is not practiced and enthusiastically praised. Instead, egotism has become more widespread.

Spain as a society was seized with hope on 28 October, and thus accepted that a change was necessary, and that perhaps it was the proper force which had triumphed. There was no institution which did not accept this. The so-called "de facto powers" helped, collaborated, or when it was desirable, kept cautiously silent. The result was an oppressed middle class, the abandonment of certain promises, and contrary to the promise that "the country is functioning," Spain is functioning worse. But the most serious thing in this assessment is the lack of impetus for the unity of Spaniards based on common pride.

#### Balance Forward

This result should not upset us in such a way that we believe that there is no longer any remedy. On the contrary, this comparison and analysis being undertaken now shows that not all is lost, that what has functioned best, or if you like less badly, is those aspects in which the government has made corrections or adapted to a realistic path. In "The Politician," Azorin described how Hernando del Pulgar, joining in a contest before the Catholic kings which involved eating every fig given him whether green or ripe, sensed with his fingers that one was rather green. Instead of eating it he immediately left the game, saying with a smile: "I will fix it for you." In other words, one does not point out the error, because as Azorin concluded, "the stupid one is not he who commits a stupidity, but he who having done so, cannot correct it."

## 'STATE OF NATION' DEBATE TO PRESAGE ELECTORAL BATTLE

Madrid ABC in Spanish 21 Oct 84 pp 28-29

[Article by Jose A. Sentis]

[Text] The political parties are assigning great importance to the discussion on the "state of the nation" being held in the Congress of Deputies this week, because of its long-term electoral repercussions. The basic challenge for the opposition is informing the public of the reality of the alternative offered, while for the government it is maintaining the viability of the offer which brought it to power in 1982. Both groups are aware that once the legislative equator has been crossed, they will be doing makeup work with a view to the next examination. This debate will range from the triumphalism of the government to the hardening criticism of the opposition.

From the strategic point of view, Popular Alliance circles consulted by ABC said that the last edition of the debate did not prove "politically profitable" for the opposition despite the apparent tone of consensus the public perceived. This was an appearance which concealed the harsh criticisms formulated of the government, since they were in all cases colored by the desire for collaboration on the major subjects affecting the state: the economic situation, terrorism, international relations, etc.

These same circles now believe that, since it has not been possible to realize some of the possibilities for interparty cooperation, for example the fruitless offer to negotiate on certain basic laws which brought Felipe Gonzalez onto the carpet in the first version of the debate, and above all, because in their judgment the current government has shown its incapacity to make the presidential assertion that "Spain is functioning" a reality, the time has come for an unconditional offensive. This is a campaign which, according to this analysis, can no longer wait, since the distance in votes separating the current party in government and the main party in the opposition is very broad.

In the view of a number of Popular Group deputies consulted, "it would be very hard for a government to do worse than this one has," although they do not deny that the present executive branch has not been able to achieve partial successes "when no other policy was available to it."

What is certain is that the impossibility of agreement between the government and the opposition which has been seen in recent months in many sectors, such

as for example the legislation on justice, the civil service, local administration, education and what is now being discussed concerning budget policy, has revealed a distance which, it is believed in conservative circles, will only worsen as the coming electoral dates approach.

The picture in the view of the right-wing benches is much darker than that presented by the government, which "has failed blatantly" to keep some of its promises to the electorate and to the chamber.

However, the prospect, in the government's view, is entirely different. A cabinet member told this periodical, for example, that the discussion is occurring precisely at a time entirely favorable to the executive branch, since in practice it is coinciding with the signing of the economic and social agreement (AES), in which Felipe Gonzalez has indicated personal interest, because of its effects on social peace until the end of the legislative term, along with the growing optimism about membership in the Common Market. The government believes it has sufficient arguments with which to dismantle criticisms of the opposition, and for this reason it sent a "communication" to the congress for discussion characterized by a clearly optimistic tone concerning economic improvement, a consolidated system of freedoms, practical completion of the autonomous model and an increasing presence abroad. This communication was criticized by the opposition, which termed it "fanciful" and "applicable to some other country," since in the text which will serve as a framework for the parliamentary discussion, "the failures of the government policy" went without mention. In the view of the opposition, these include, for example, the unkept promise to create jobs, due to an inadequate economic policy, incapable of encouraging private investment; the constant insecurity of the citizenry, such that there can be no talk of public freedoms; the poverty of the autonomous socialist model, since the LOAPA was declared unconstitutional; the foreign policy, which they term "pro-Third World," and inconsistent with Western integration, as the reticence with regard to NATO indicates.

The counterarguments of the government regarding the provisions of the AES and the imminent membership in the EEC will be the advances made in the struggle against terrorism with the cooperation of France, the containment of inflation and the public deficit and the strengthening of the balance of payments in the economic sector, as well as the completion of the majority of the transfers to the autonomous communities and the diplomatic campaigns Felipe Gonzalez himself has carried out in connection with what the socialist government regards as a "contribution to peace and world detente."

According to the circles consulted, the proposition set forth by the opposition might include as a key question "whether Spaniards are living better now than before." This is a question which Manuel Fraga himself posed during the previous debate on the state of the nation.

The government, on the contrary, may effect a turnabout in its argument with regard to the earlier requests for sacrifice and solidarity which imbued the "ethical message" of the president, with greater emphasis on the better expectations for Spain in all sectors. Following the argument as to "the

legacy received," there is a hope for a promising future based on improvement in the economic indicators, the prospects for membership in the EEC and social stability.

#### Leadership Potential of Gonzalez and Fraga at Issue

The debate on the state of the nation will, in addition to the comparison of two political alternatives and two political analyses, represent a clash between two leaders. Felipe Gonzalez and Manuel Fraga will be in the eye of the public, but will also be the focus of attention in their respective groups, which are preparing for this "battle of the image."

The prime minister and the leader of the opposition are aware of the importance of their respective speeches, as is revealed by their careful preparation. In the case of Felipe Gonzalez, his speech benefits from the contribution of two government "files" analyzed and structured by the "brain trust" in Moncloa headed by Roberto Dorado, and will not be without the influence of the pen of Alfonso Guerra.

Fraga, for his part, has also asked his advisers in the various sectors with which he will deal in his speech for their opinions, but where the opposition leader is concerned, it will be his own pen which will draft the text which will serve as a basis for the debate. Fraga does not want to waste his opportunity, and he preferred to draft his speech carefully, to do which he even postponed the 4-day trip he had planned to the Canary Islands.

Each of the political groups supporting its leader regards it as of basic importance, as their representatives have informed ABC, that the leader of its rank and file be capable of "rising above" his opponent, and winning in the assessment of the public audience, which will be especially broad because of the special television coverage of the debate.

However, within each party there are differences as to the content which should be included, as well as the form, to achieve this goal. Where the Popular Alliance (AP) is concerned, some of the leaders hope that the debate will "destroy the flawless image of Felipe Gonzalez," and they regard it as necessary that Fraga continue with the hard-line strategy intensified by a part of his parliamentary group since the beginning of this period of parliamentary sessions.

These leaders have indicated their concern about the fact that "the special sensitivity of Fraga to questions of state is serving as an obstacle to his role in opposition to Felipe Gonzalez."

With regard to Felipe Gonzalez, socialist circles consulted by this newspaper are relying on a certain confidence in the meeting of the two leaders because, they say, "Felipe Gonzalez has a better chance than Fraga in a personal confrontation." But there is concern among them as well, since the figures shown by the surveys show a steady deterioration in the popularity of the prime minister.

For the socialists it is not solely a question of achieving an excellent defense of the actions of the government of these recent years, or even winning a "moral victory" over the opposition, but also and more basically ensuring that Felipe Gonzalez "renews his political discourse," in order to create a sense among the voters and on the socialist base level that the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] has lost.

The legislative equator also marks the beginning of the coming electoral campaign, the electoral experts believe. And this campaign will demand that Felipe Gonzalez begin to adopt clearly popular measures which are understandable to the population, as various ministers located outside the purely economic area have urged.

Manuel Fraga will also speak to those within his own political group, and not only to the public. His party colleagues, who do not see any feasible response coming from the leadership of the Popular Coalition, also believe it necessary that the parties in the coalition get this clear impression, along with the AP itself, some of the leaders of which have on certain occasions postulated the possibility of taking over.

5157

CSO: 3548/24



## LASSE BUDTZ, SDP'S SECURITY POLICY SPOKESMAN, PROFILED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Nov 84 p 17

[Article by Helle Bygum]

[Text] "I have for a long time been sleeping badly in the night, and it is because Lasse has got the post he has got."

A statement by an old friend on Lasse Budtz, the security policy spokesman of the Social Democratic Party, whose political conduct continually alarms the public--fellow party members as well as opponents.

Perhaps right until Thursday when, as the unfortunate hero, he was given the party's poorest marks for his statement in parliament, attacking the government on its security policy.

The big scheme he had contrived turned out a flop. And even those who do not drink coffee or beer with Lasse Budtz almost started feeling sorry for him when from the rostrum of the Folketing he pleaded with the spokesmen of the government parties not to question the positive NATO policy of the Social Democratic Party.

For Lasse Johan Albert Bayer Budtz is actually "a sincere and naive man of peace" with an acute sense of the directions of the wind. As they say at Christiansborg: Those whose aims are high must each morning suck their index fingers to find the direction of the wind and then arrange it so that they have the wind behind them--and that is what he does.

By a stretch of imagination, it might also be called "political flair," and nobody will seriously deny that he has got that ability. Nor any serious political involvement. Although he grew up in a home which was anything but Social Democratic, he has always been a socialist. He began in DSU [Social Democratic Youth], and even though he said in 1970 that "a seat in parliament has never tempted me," he was nominated in the Bispebjerg constituency only 2 years later and, in the election in 1973, he was voted into parliament as the well-known TV figure with a large number of personal votes.

In the election 2 years later, his popularity had declined sharply, which is quite understandable, for nobody--not even his friends--would say that he is a popular figure as politician on TV.

His arrogance, his "know it all" attitude annoy even the most gentle doves of peace. But Lasse Budtz, apparently, could not care less, to him it is not a question of elegance or charisma but a question of message. His diligence as a politician is reflected in the numerous letters to the editor and articles which he has handed into editorial offices, stating his various positions and why he takes those positions and why the Social Democratic Party takes the position it has taken until it takes a new position.

That is why it is also a bit difficult placing him in the party. He is regarded as standing to the left of the "wing of custodians" though probably right in the center to the right of Anker Jorgensen, the "peace hawk." "It is a bit awkward for him being Anker's adviser and copying draft parliamentary statements." Whereas others, in turn, regard his role as being that of the messenger boy.

However, he never has a lack of statements in defense of his actions. After having warned voters against "throwing away their votes" in the elections to the EC parliament in 1979, he became scared and said no, thank you when the bell rang for the deputy member and there was access to Strasbourg, then the important EC work was suddenly not too important. The work at home against missiles was more important.

An event which is well-remembered within the party and which meant a change to a new constituency--K.B. Andersen's former Skive constituency. There are, therefore, some colleagues in the Folketing who do not entirely appreciate it when in the Folketing last year, during one of the numerous debates on missiles, Lasse Budtz kicked the shins of K.B. Andersen: "We cannot attach any importance to the view of K.B. Andersen on the NATO policy of the Social Democratic Party. They must be based on ignorance. But, of course, that can happen to a man who no longer is in the center of things," as quoted by B.T.

When he was about to leave for the Soviet Union already last year but was torpedoed by a Soviet submarine in the Swedish Archipelago, he fell silent, however, after his fellow traveller, Kjeld Olesen, officially corrected his view that that event could not form any obstacle to the trip.

That is, however, what it became, and it was only this fall that Lasse Budtz took on the role of "assistant foreign minister," visiting the Soviet Union to explain that "we do not intend to declare war," as stated in the sarcastic comments in the newspapers. A sarcastic remark which many doubt that Lasse Budtz quite appreciates, as his own well-developed sense of sarcasm and irony hardly extends to a sense of humor. Or self-irony.

Lasse Budtz is a journalist by profession. He started his career at KOBENHAVNS AMTSAVIS, later got into TV, but was beforehand with B.T., among other places, where--in a friendlier manner than his present frantic volubility--he wrote about NATO and boa constrictors in the Copenhagen Zoo. Even so well that the renowned editor Ralph Buch found that B.T. could use the article--every day! as the anecdote has it.

Lasse Buetz has been chairman of the Committee on Culture of the Folketing, and cultural policy is almost as important to him as missiles. As far as his private life is concerned, he lives with the ballet dancer Arlette Weinrich, and in a self-portrait to B.T. he has stated that he would have liked to have the talents of a pianist, that his favorite painter is Wilhelm Freddie, that he likes best of all the person of Ole Jastrau in the novel "Malicious Damage" because of his humaneness, and that the traits which he evaluates highest in both men and women are honesty and broad-mindedness.

And, then, his favorite flower is the red peony--although the symbol of the Social Democratic Party is the thorny red rose.

7262

CSO: 3613/31

## PAPER EXAMINES CONTINUED SECURITY POLICY DEBATES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Nov 84 p 10

[Editorial: "Self-Respect and Respect"]

[Text] The intense discussion of the Danish foreign policy and security policy which has marked Danish politics of recent years will not have been concluded even if some kind of armistice was entered into last Thursday in the Folketing. Another discussion is still expected when the much discussed Dyvig report will be presented to the Folketing, and it is an open question whether that discussion will lead to broader agreement than the existing one or whether it will open up new political fronts.

In the midst of the Danish showdown, there is a tendency to ignore the fact that also outside the borders of our country, security policy positions are in the process of changing. It has not been clarified what the effect will be of the so-called European dimension in security policy matters. Will there be an intensification of the cooperation within the West-European union, and, if so, what will it mean to the cooperation within NATO? Will the desire on the part of certain Americans for a changed distribution of the burden within NATO become further reinforced after the American presidential election, and, if so, how will it influence the commitments in the area of defense of the European partners?

These are questions which are crucial in connection with an overall and long-term evaluation of the organization of the Danish defense, the tasks it will get, the objectives which it will serve, and the set-up which it will be given.

In an interview in this paper last Saturday, the newly appointed defense chief, General Otto K. Lund, stressed that he considered it his most important task to reinforce the self-respect of the Danish defense in order thereby to increase its respect among our NATO allies. In order to attain that goal, the defense chief needs peace and stability in connection with the defense issue. It is a question of peace and stability with regard to the framework of grants within which it has to work, but it is also a question of peace and stability with regard to political signals to the Armed Forces. A defense is a political tool. It can only work on the basis given it by the political processes. After the defense agreement of the summer it has been generally felt that the defense agreement was beneficial as a political manifestation of the fact that there

is still broad agreement on the conditions of existence of the Danish Armed Forces. However, the Armed Forces are bound to find that the funds which were made available within the framework of the agreement make heavy demands on the defense leadership. With insufficient funds, our self-respect must be reinforced and respect gained.

That is in itself a difficult task. But it may be better solved if the security policy discussion of the coming months finally puts a lid on the political insecurity. Also for that reason should the discussion be thorough, objective and clarifying.

7262

CSO: 3613/31



## SEVENTY PERCENT OF SOLDIERS ENTER SERVICE AS VOLUNTEERS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Nov 84 p 5

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] Seven of ten fulfilling their compulsory military service volunteer and by doing so have the opportunity of determining themselves how and when they will do their military duty, according to a report from Defense Minister Hans Engell to the Defense Committee of the Folketing.

The Defense Center for Leadership has determined in a statistically correct poll that 71 percent of those with required military service want to be called in, while 29 percent would rather be free. The latter were asked later, after they were in uniform, whether they had anything against doing their military duty. To this 16 percent answered that they had nothing against it, four percent said they had no position on the question, and nine percent that they didn't like being called in. This means that only about 2,000 of the total conscript force of 23,000 men from the three services are dissatisfied with serving their constitutionally required military service.

The background for the report is an investigation undertaken by the executive committee of the Organization of Conscripts in which it is claimed that the Defense Command is wrong in claiming that 75 percent of the conscripts are volunteers. They claim that the correct figure is only 44 percent.

The mistake seems to be attributed to the manipulation of the concept, "technical volunteers," which is used by the volunteer conscripts if their desire for the place and time of the enlistment could not be met. Under normal circumstances they would be offered an alternative enlistment place, and if this doesn't satisfy them they can have their volunteer criteria removed.

In its investigation, the conscript organization also deals with certain conditions in connection with military criminal law, health insurance regulations, and the working time and environment of the soldiers.

The minister stressed in this connection that maintenance of the military criminal law is not an expression of lack of confidence in the conscripts, but is only made necessary by the special character of military service.

Concerning working times, it says that no formal working time has been established, but that the attempt is made to maintain a 40 hour work week, and that the Defense Command has introduced a rule that gives the conscripts compensation for watches on Saturdays and Sundays. It specifies that defense is in principle subject to the laws on the environment. But the exception is actual military service.

9124

CSO: 3613/35

## BRIEFS

FUNDS SHORTAGE CANCELS EXERCISE--The Eastern District Command will carry out 19 to 21 November the yearly maneuver Emerald Horizon, which this year, among other things for economic reasons, has taken the form of a conference on the total defense of the Zealand island group. The conference, in which participants from the army, police, home guard, civil defense, and a series of other civilian units, is taking place at Antvorskov Barracks at Slafsele. "It is to discuss the problems that can arise in a wartime situation and to make plans for a solution," Lieutenant Colonel J. Lauritzen explained. "There are completely unforeseeable problems that can arise in a combat situation. Even though we of the Eastern District Command consider the problems mainly from a military point of view, we understand that to the greatest possible extent we must be prepared to consider the civilian population in the area," the colonel said. "And therefore we must agree ahead of time how we will maintain communication with one another," he said. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Nov 84 p 8] 9124

CSO: 3613/35

## 'INFLEXIBLE' NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PASSES FIRST TRIALS

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 6 Oct 84 pp 5-7

[Article by Midshipman (R) Trouve]

[Text] On a calm sea, the first and vital part of the tests carried out on the NSLE [guided-missile nuclear submarine] "L'Inflexible," which constitute the official testing of the ship, are being completed. Launched in June 1982, and commissioned for testing since November of that year, "L'Inflexible" is placed under the control of the Navy Standing Commission on Ship Testing, the CPE.

The sixth SNLE, this younger brother of "Le Redoutable" is the first M4 SNLE; all other units in service, except for "Le Redoutable," will be retrofitted to the M4 standard. For the expert, M4 means first of all that "L'Inflexible" is equipped with the new generation of ballistic missiles, which are larger and perform better than their M20 predecessors: increased range--over 4,000 km--multiple heads, revised and modernized weapons systems reflecting the latest data-processing technologies.

M4 retrofitting also implies a number of improvements concerning operations: navigation, transmissions, submarine detection, tactical-situation monitoring, new weapons (including the SM 39 environment-changing missile) are also state-of-the-art French technology. Finally, let us also mention pell-mell increased standardization and equipment reliability, a reduction of radiated noise and improved housing.

The first part of the tests was thus completed after several months of intensive work. We are a long way from the first nuclear boiler-room, when the submarine moored at quay would pull on its hawsers to find its "fixed point." Since then, "L'Inflexible" has covered a distance equivalent to once around the globe and has gone on and under water at surprising speeds, in spite of its 9,000 tons.

Today, "L'Inflexible" has logged over 1,000 hours under water at the prescribed submerged depths and under all types of conditions. How many tests did it not have to undergo in over 100 days at sea! Of course, the early life of a submarine is not all roses: after weighing it, engineers force it to assume all possible positions, the most uncomfortable, the most un-

seemly, and subject it to the worst treatments; all the while, the crew must hold on tight and walk on the partitions if there is too much trim. In addition to these "diving safety" and machinery tests, the so-called "platform tests," there are others that are at least equally important, those that are intended to test "L'Inflexible's" capacity as a warship. In that case, too, all the equipment is tested under all possible conditions: transmissions, electromagnetic detection, tactics, weapons. The crew must adjust to unusual situations and finetune its play to achieve precise configurations described in testing programs in spite of natural conditions (unfavorable bathythermal profile, currents, etc.). "L'Inflexible" has fired with all its tubes, whether horizontal or vertical,... successfully. These results have required much effort on the part of the crew, of the Cherbourg DCAN [Directorate for Naval Weapons and Shipbuilding] and on the part of the companies involved in the submarine's construction. Since the tests started, the crew--headed by Com F. Metayer--consists of four thirds, according to a curious arithmetic which has been common in the Navy for a long time. During all that period, the four thirds have relayed one another: three thirds at sea, one third on land. Thanks to this system, the core of the second crew was trained to use the new equipment, leaving on land a group monitoring any problems encountered at sea. Finally, all--with the exception of senior officers--were given a few days' leave. At sea, the tests are carried out around the clock! Each moment was used, day or night. Whenever possible, several tests were carried out simultaneously. A very sustained rhythm that ignored weekends and other landsmen's holidays.

An excellent atmosphere prevailed during this period of hard work. The crew worked conscientiously with a good team spirit, each being motivated by his passion for his work and his pride to serve on such a ship.

Among other records, "L'Inflexible" probably holds that of the French submarine with the largest population: on each run, in addition to the 127 crew members, 52 passengers of various origins (CDAN, civilian companies, etc.) embarked, i.e. a total of close to 180 people!

Makeshift bedding was set up in all nooks and corners (torpedo and missile compartments, sick bay, various technical rooms, etc.); you can imagine the logistic problems created by this overpopulation--and readily solved by the "civilian household"--: three courses noon and evening, at the cafeteria and at the mess-room; generally well-accepted cohabitation, most passengers contributing to carry out the tests and even sometimes keeping watch to complete them! Those who have had the experience of a ship in commission know that this is a difficult period, especially when it is essential to comply with a schedule: "L'Inflexible" is expected to join the FOST [Strategic Ocean Force].

This success was emphasized by Com A. Campredon, chairman of the CPE: on the last run, he congratulated the crew, the engineers and technicians who contributed to the construction of "L'Inflexible" for their competence, their eagerness to work, their calm and their high spirits.

"L'Inflexible" has entered the stage of "disassembly after testing." In a few months, it will go back to sea for the second part of its tests, after



which it will accomplish its long-duration voyage before being approved for active service. It is a superb ship, which is absolutely ready and will join the ranks of the FOST some time in 1985 to contribute to the defense of the country.

9294

CSO: 3519/104

## BRIEFS

FALL MEDITERRANEAN EXERCISE--From 27 September to 5 November, the Mediterranean fleet will take part in an important exercise that will consist of three stages: in the western Mediterranean, in the Tyrrhenian Sea and in the Aegean Sea. This major exercise is designed to enable the naval air forces to be trained in antiship, antisubmarine and antiaircraft battle. The French intervention in Lebanon demonstrated the availability of our naval forces. The various "Olifant" missions provided excellent training for the ships assigned each in turn to the Naval Force 452. The French presence in the western Mediterranean is now ensured by a single corvette. After putting its equipment and personnel back in condition, the Mediterranean fleet is therefore resuming its traditional operations. This voyage groups the guided-missile cruiser "Colbert" carrying the flag of Vice-Admiral Denis, commander of the Mediterranean fleet, the aircraft-carrier "Foch," the guided-missile destroyer "Suffren," the antisubmarine corvette "Dupleix," the fleet escort ship "D'Estrees" and the supply-tanker "Meuse." The avisos "QM Anquetil" and "Commandant de Pimodan" of the Mediterranean flotilla were taking part in this fall exercise, as well as several attack submarines of the Mediterranean fleet. The ships are scheduled to call at Salonika, Volos and Cavalla in Greece, at Split in Yugoslavia, and at Venice in Italy. [Text] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 13 Oct 84 pp 20-21] 9294

CSO: 3519/104

## DEFENSE MINISTER REPLIES TO STORTING QUERIES ON BUDGET

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Oct 84 p 2

[Article by Morten Malmø]

[Text] Norway's contribution to NATO's infrastructure program this year amounts to 6.6 million kroner. Norway will then have paid 17.1 million kroner toward the said program out of our share of a total of 49 million kroner. This information was provided by Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad in his reply to a question from Stein Ørnhøi of the Socialist Left Party during the Storting queries yesterday. The new intermediate-range missiles which are deployed on the western side are financed through the said infrastructure program.

Minister of Transport and Communications Johan J. Jakobsen stated during the Storting queries that plans are being worked on for the establishment of an all-year round SAS route between Oslo and Bodø with departures between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. Jacobsen, who answered a question from Ragna Berget Jørgensen (Labor Party) assumed that such a route will be established in the summer of 1985. In answer to a question from Mons Espelid (Liberal Party), Undersecretary Jakobsen said that it is not yet topical to change the rules for the so-called B-mail. Espelid said that the limit of 20 shipments is too high.

## NATO Radio

The Department of Culture and Science will now ask the Telecommunications Directorate to prepare a report on the actual area covered for broadcasts from the American Forces Network, the so-called NATO radio. Langslet said, however, that the concession was granted under an exemption provided by the law governing broadcasting. The cable company Janco, Inc. has wanted to re-broadcast the transmission of the NATO radio over its network. On this subject, Langslet said that, under the Norwegian law, it is perfectly legal to re-broadcast radio transmissions via cable networks. Langslet answered a question from Stein Ørnhøi of the Socialist-Left Party, who, in a rejoinder, expressed his great dissatisfaction with the reply given by the undersecretary. Ørnhøi said that the Storting has no access to allowing foreign authorities to cover the capital of Norway with a 24-hour music station. "I quite understand the irritation felt by the local radio stations," Ørnhøi said. This caused Langslet to answer as follows: "The legislation and rules governing broadcasting do not contain any provisions to the effect that only Norwegians may broadcast within Norway.

The things which Mr Ørnhøi says about the law are probably the way he wants it to be interpreted, like in the "good, old days" when the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation had the monopoly, the power and the honor, and everything else was prohibited!"

#### Contractors

A number of representatives of the Labor Party asked questions on the so-called contractor activities during the Storting querries yesterday. Among the questions was a question from Astric Murberg Martinsen (Labor Party) who wanted to know what Minister of Consumer Affairs and Administration Astrid Gjertsen may do to ensure that the state uses serious firms and not contractors for its construction projects. The undersecretary answered as follows:

"The principle is that the state must choose the most favorable bidder. Only firms which have the professional qualifications will be considered. The state will, however, not enter into so-called contractual obligations which apply between the contractor and those working for him.

In a question directed to Undersecretary Astrid Gjertsen, Harald Ellefsen of the Conservative Party took up the matter that wage agreements may prevent, for example, banks from staying open on Saturdays. Ellefsen wanted to know what may be done to prevent this. The undersecretary said, however, that the authorities have to be cautious about intervening in the right of free negotiations. Mrs Gjertsen, moreover, pointed out that the parties will have to take the consumers into consideration when entering into such agreements, and she stressed the great need for more flexible opening hours and work hours.

7262

CSO: 3639/21

## BRIEFS

BOOKLET ON DEFENSE, NATO POLICIES--"Focus on NATO Strategy" is the title of a booklet which has just appeared. The booklet has been published by Forsvarets Høyskoleforening [the Armed Forces College Association] and contains lectures and comments from a seminar conducted earlier in the year by the College Association and attended by, among others, NATO's supreme military chief in Europe, General Bernard Rogers, former Defense Minister Robert McNamara, Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad and West German Undersecretary Lothar Ruhl. The lectures and the comments provide a good introduction to the debate on a new strategy for NATO against the background of the arms developments and the international situation. Grethe Vernø, M.P., who headed the debate, points out in a preface that nuclear weapons are not the only controversial issue. The public debate will, to an equally great extent, concentrate on the reasons for the conflicts in Europe and the military and political threats facing us. The seminar, moreover, showed that there is broad agreement on raising the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, that the conventional defense ought to be strengthened but also that there is a need for nuclear forces which may have a deterrent effect on threats of use of nuclear weapons. "Focus on NATO Strategy" is in English, and those interested may apply to Forsvarets Høyskoleforening, Forsvarets Høyskole Oslo mil./Akershus. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Oct 84 p 5] 7262

CSO: 3639/21



## BRIEFS

MILITARY COOPERATION WITH ANGOLA--Prime Minister Mario Soares told AFRICA JORNAL that he favors the establishment of military cooperation with Angola and Mozambique, since this does not imply sending troops to those two countries. Mario Soares stated that "it is not out of the question that Portuguese officers might go to Angola or Mozambique to train military personnel of those countries." However, he rejected participation of Portuguese military in any possible multinational force which might be set up by the United Nations in that region, saying that "there are delicate issues and sensitive feelings" because of "our colonial past." [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 20 Oct 84 p 2] 2641

REDUCTION IN DEFENSE EXPENSES--As he was leaving on Wednesday [17 October] for Vendas Novas to participate in the "Orion 84" military exercises, Deputy Prime Minister Mota Pinto stated that the new state budget will contain less money for national defense. He added, though, that if "resources spent on the armed forces have to take the national situation into account," they will in any case "be large enough to guarantee acceptable functioning." [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 20 Oct 84 p 2] 2641

NEW GNR COMMANDANT-- Brigadier General Joao Ramiro Alves Ribeiro, 51 years old, has taken over command of the GNR [Republican National Guard], replacing Brigadier General Carlos Jose Saraiva Lima de Almeida e Brito; the latter has been promoted to General and is now commander of the Southern Military Region. Alves Ribeiro, who has had two tours of duty in Angola and two in Guinea, comes from the Cavalry, and entered the Army School in November 1951. During his career he has had several foreign assignments, and participated in NATO exercises in Italy as second in command of the First Mixed Independent Brigade, with headquarters in Santa Margarida. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 17 Oct 84 p 8] 2641

COMMANDOS COOPERATE WITH SPAIN--Within the framework of military cooperation between Portugal and Spain, a regiment of commandos, comprising 152 men, is now in Spain, to participate in joint exercises with the Special Operations forces of the Spanish army. The exercises are taking place in the province of Caceres and will last until 31 October. Their purpose is training in guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare and "cooperation between the Portuguese and Spanish forces, with exchange of training." [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 24 Oct 84 p 4] 2641

NEW AZORES MILITARY COMMANDANT--Brigadier General Oliveira Carvalho will assume the duties of commandant of the Azores Military Zone on 22 October, it was learned from a military source. Oliveira Carvalho will replace Brigadier General Abel Cabral Couto, who has been commandant of the Azores Military Zone since October 1982. The military ceremony of the change in command will take place on the artillery field and garrison No 1, in Ponta Delgada, before a battalion made up of companies from the three army units located in Sao Miguel. Brigadier General Manuel Ribeiro Oliveira Carvalho has up to now been deputy director of the Institute of Advanced Military Studies. [Text] [Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 19 Oct 84 p 9] 2641

CSO: 3542/34

## MADRID MOVES TO DEFUSE TENSION WITH RABAT

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 4 Nov 84 pp 20-21

[Article by Carlos Yarnoz: "Spain, Morocco Politely Watch Each Other"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Madrid--The deployment of Spanish military power to the south and east coast of the peninsula has aroused more concern among the Moroccans than an entire arsenal at the door of their home. To Spanish strategists, the Libyan-Moroccan treaty has also aroused suspicion. However, Spanish-Moroccan military relations have never been better. Spain has even offered to construct ships for the Moroccan Navy. During this /idyll/, both countries watch each other and rearm, studying the potential of their neighbor.

The 414 Roland antiaircraft missiles acquired by Spain will be deployed, mainly along the southern and eastern coasts of the peninsula. The only division that has three brigades will be in the Southern Military Region. The 72 F-18A planes of the FACA [expansion unknown] program were selected for their capacity to carry thousands of kilos of bombs to the target area. Many of the theoretical tests of the airplane included targets in northern Africa.

The future Air-Naval Combat Group--which will have fighter-bombers on board and three frigates with antisubmarine helicopters--will be based in Rota (Cadiz) and deployed between the peninsula and the Canary Islands. Its radius of action will cover almost the entire Moroccan territory. The 19,000 soldiers in Ceuta and Melilla who will soon have antitank and antiaircraft missiles train more than ever for offensive actions to penetrate Moroccan territory, the only way to defend the posts.

All this deployment is eminently offensive. Morocco has already had the Chaparral type of antiaircraft missiles for years. The neighboring country has an even more advanced system of alert and control than Spain and Morocco already has shelters for combat planes which Spain started to construct this year. However, the modernization programs have a projection that goes beyond our borders. The deployment will be completed and operational between 1986 and 1988. The Moroccan military, almost all now involved in the war against the Polisario Front, are very suspicious of all this strength on the doorstep itself of their home.

The view from the peninsula is that Morocco and Libya have just signed a treaty this summer to unite the two countries. President Felipe Gonzalez quickly stated that this agreement did not affect Spain. Narcis Serra was more cautious. Just before leaving for Morocco last Wednesday, he refused to talk about it. However, the strategists on the general staff of the Ministry of Defense hastily evaluated the military consequences of the treaty.

It should be pointed out that, in the last PEC [Joint Strategic Plan] drawn up in 1981, Libya was excluded as a possible threat. It will be hard not to include Libya, the main power now in northern Africa, in the next PEC that will be approved at the end of this year.

#### 'Friendly Countries'

Facing these prospects, the defense authorities in Morocco and Spain quickly exchanged reassuring messages. According to sources close to the minister, one of Serra's main objectives in his recent visit to Morocco is to convince the Moroccans that the deployment of Spanish strength to the south is not focused on the neighboring country but rather on control of the Strait of Gibraltar and the Spanish desire to guarantee traffic with the Canary Islands in case of conflict.

In this effort to eliminate mutual suspicion, there have been many contacts and attempts to collaborate militarily between the two countries in recent years. This is especially true of the two air forces that realized their first joint air exercises last Tuesday and Wednesday. There is already speculation about the possibility of connecting the alert and control networks of the two countries.

Much of this activity has occurred after Col Mohamed Abachar, trained in the Administration Corps Academy in Avila, was named secretary general of defense. Abachar, one of the Moroccan soldiers who has the best relations with Spain, visited Madrid last year. He said at that time: "Spain and Morocco are two friendly countries, bathed by the same sea. They are interested in a common defense of the countries in the area."

During Serra's visit, the minister--who already announced his intention to sign a military cooperation agreement with Morocco in November 1983--has offered for Spain to build ships for the future Moroccan Royal Navy.

In spite of these good intentions, neither Morocco or Spain can forget the problem of Ceuta and Melilla even though both countries are part of the same defensive orbit, that of the West. After signing the Libyan-Moroccan treaty, Hassan II referred to the unification of the country "without forgetting the cities in the north." In his tactless statements this week, the former captain general of Zaragoza, Manuel Alvarez Zalba, spoke of the difficult defense of the two posts.

The current /idyll/ in military relations obscures other obvious facts. In 1982, Alberto Aliart, then minister of defense, said that the objective of national defense was to obtain control of the Strait of Gibraltar in a world

"where the instability of some political regimes concerns us" in northern Africa. The current government holds the same philosophy. The objective of the PEC is to strengthen the Baleares-Strait-Canary axis. Under that policy, the men in the intelligence services covering northern Africa "work harder than ever," according to intelligence sources.

#### F-18's Against F-16's

At the same time, the armed forces of both countries make enormous economic efforts to acquire materiel like their neighbor's. The main effort, like in every advanced country after the most recent war experiences, is focused on the Air Force. After the purchase of the F-18A's by Spain, Morocco is quickly trying to acquire F-16, F-20 or Mirage 2,000 planes, adapted to intercept the F-18's. According to Spanish estimates, Morocco will have five combat squadrons in 1990 compared to seven in Spain. Lacking a navy, Morocco has acquired many Exocet antiship missiles and will soon have Aspide missiles. With fewer combat planes, some time ago Morocco acquired 30 launchers (Spain will only have 18 within the next 2 years) of Chaparral low-altitude antiaircraft missiles. The 19,000 soldiers assigned to Ceuta and Melilla will soon have anti-aircraft and antitank missiles.

Decisive elements merge in this paradoxical situation. Spain, a member of NATO, has not asked what NATO's position would be in case of a conflict in Ceuta and Melilla, both outside the zone of action of NATO. Spain and Morocco have similar treaties of friendship with the United States although Morocco is considered a /more loyal ally/. The most powerful military force in the area continues to be the U.S. Sixth Fleet deployed in the Mediterranean. It has more than 50 ships, 200 combat planes and 25,000 men.

To further complicate the current situation, both Algeria which is seen as part of the Maghreb as well as the Polisario Front are very suspicious of the Spanish-Moroccan rapprochement.

#### Serra Proposes That Bazan Construct Moroccan War Fleet

One of the most important results of Minister of Defense Narcis Serra's recent visit to Morocco was the offer to the neighboring country that the shipyards of Bazan National Enterprise construct units for the future Moroccan Navy, today practically nonexistent. The offer was made at a time when both countries seem willing to cooperate militarily but also means continuation of a policy to increase arms sales to the neighboring country. In the last 3 years, they have totaled more than 15 billion pesetas.

The Moroccan Navy is the real /weak point/ of defense of the neighboring country. All its strength is concentrated in the corvette "Coronel Al Rahmani" and four launches. The five ships carry Exocet antiship missiles. Both the corvette, the current flagship of the Moroccan Royal Navy, as well as the launches were constructed by Bazan in the last 2 years. The launches are valued at 5 billion pesetas and were christened "Katabi," "Boutouba," "El Kharti" and "Azougghgar." Serra announced that the neighboring country will buy more launches of this type.



Morocco's main interest in having a real navy lies in the need to participate in control of the Strait of Gibraltar, maintained now almost exclusively by the United States and Great Britain and only in a small way by Spain and France. Therefore, the top objective of the Moroccan Navy is the acquisition of FFG frigates like those now being built in Ferrol under U.S. license. These frigates carry Lamps helicopters--costing 5 billion pesetas each--which are considered the most advanced antisubmarine system in the world.

Also Morocco needs naval strength to stop maritime arms supplies to the Polisario Front which uses the port of Guera and, according to some reports, another Mauritanian port.

#### Strategic Advantages

Probably the United States will not place obstacles to the possible sale of FFG's to Morocco. It did not when Spain requested permission to sell the corvette equipped with technology made in the USA. However, there are doubts about Morocco's ability to buy such expensive systems. In 1983 Morocco did not make some payments for the launches and the corvette; the accumulated debts reached \$27 million.

The Moroccan defense budget, according to the Military Balance 1983-84, was slightly more than 200 billion pesetas in 1982, about 9 percent of the GNP. It is estimated that Morocco spends more than 300 million pesetas daily in efforts to control the Polisario Front alone.

However, according to the directors of the shipbuilding industry as well as the strategists consulted, the advantages for Spain of an operation like this are obvious. To the former, this program could alleviate the serious crisis at Bazan; last year it lost more than 8 billion pesetas. For the latter, it is always good to sell advanced materiel to an enemy power since the supplier can better control the systems of the purchaser and the spare parts.

Arms collaboration with Morocco has clear precedents in the last decade. Arms supplies began in 1976 and 1977. Morocco bought Land Rover vehicles--in March 1977 alone 240 vehicles were sold for \$2.00 [as published]--recoilless rifles, mortars and pistols from Spain. Supplies have continued. In 1982 1,653,000,000 pesetas worth of ammunition and rifles, 1,291,000,000 in mortars, 453 million in naval units and 300 million in explosives were exported. The most recent shipments were made by the enterprise Alkantara, not directly to Morocco but through Saudi Arabia, according to Serra.

7717

CSO: 3548/38

## ECONOMISTS AGREE ON SOLIDITY OF UPTURN

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 2 Nov 84 p 36

[Article by Thomas Knutzen]

[Text] The Danish economy is doing extremely well. Economists in Denmark are agreed on this evaluation. "It is not merely a question of empty words on the part of politicians that optimism has now returned," says Ole Vistisen, department head of the Danish Employers' Association. The encouraging figures on which Danish economists base their evaluations show that Danish exports were 20 percent higher in August than the previous year, the volume of orders on hand was as much as 27 percent higher. Danish industry follows up by investing at a higher rate than ever before. This year, investments will increase by approximately 45-50 percent. Nevertheless, it is the balance of payments problems and the ticking time bomb of interest payments which dictate the Danish economic policy.

"Our constant problem is that interest costs increase at such a fast rate that the supporting economy cannot cope with them," Torben Nielsen, chief economist of the Private Bank, tells AFTENPOSTEN.

## Indebted

Denmark is an indebted country, and its debts continue to increase. The national debt now amounts to approximately 350 billion kroner. The interest costs of the Danish national budget will, next year, amount to 53 billion kroner. The burden of debt corresponds to approximately 75 percent of the gross national product, and the increasing interest rates in the dollar market, therefore, have cost the Danish state approximately 5 billion kroner in increased interest costs.

Denmark has a foreign debt of approximately 180 billion kroner, half of which is in dollars. Consequently, both the increasing interest rates and the soaring dollar rates have created problems for Denmark and the so-called restoration policy of the Danish government. However, in addition to the financial expenditures, as much as 30 percent of Denmark's import is in dollars, whereas only 17-17-18 percent of the export is in dollars.

The external balance problems affects the Danish economy and are especially reflected in the high interest level. "Current items of the balance of payments

deficit have to be financed. This requires that we have an interest level which lies above the foreign interest level in order to encourage capital imports," Torben Nielsen points out. "This higher interest level makes it more difficult to reduce the deficit on the national budget."

### Tight Policy

Denmark is thus still involved in the interest spiral, against which the country has been warned from many sides. To solve the budget problems, the balance of payments problem will first have to be solved. However, in order to do this, such a tight policy will have to be pursued that it may create problems in the labor market. And in order to accomplish the improvement in the competitiveness on which the country is dependent to improve its balance of payments, the parties of the labor market will have to be involved.

Vistisen of the Employers' Association says that the policy pursued by the government encounters enormous resistance from the trade union movement, whereas the opinion polls show that people are, in general, in agreement with the need to pursue such a tight policy. Poul Nyrop Rasmussen, chief economist of the National Federation of Labor Unions in Denmark, on the other hand, fears that the government has adopted a policy of confrontation. "I fear that they may reach the limit of pressure put on a responsible trade union leadership," he says, adding that if they try anew to reduce wage increases by 50 percent, it may have negative effects on the productivity of Danish industry.

The Danish economic policy is based on a number of assumptions with regard to the international development. In addition, Denmark must do better than the rest of the world.

### Growth Rate of 3 - 3.5 Percent

Internationally, the growth rate is expected to continue at a rate of 3 to 3.5 percent per annum, and a drop in the interest level is also expected. Internally, there will be a zero growth rate in the public budgets and an unchanged tax level. The competitiveness will be improved by keeping the rate of wage increases a couple of percent lower than abroad. The rates of exchange of the Danish krone will be maintained at a fixed level. The monetary policy in Denmark is the task of the Central Bank, which has made it clear that it will absorb the growth in the money supply caused by the deficits in the budgets of the public sector. It is now said openly that the goal is to reduce the Danish interest level to approximately 8 percent, from the present 13-14 percent. These measures would cause the balance of payments deficit, which this year will amount to approximately 15-16 billion kroner, to be eliminated by 1988. The deficit on the national budget will this year amount to approximately 43 billion kroner. It is expected to have been eliminated by the end of the decade.

However, even if Denmark will achieve a growth rate which in relation to other countries may be compared to the Japanese miracle in the sixties, the unemployment rate will merely be reduced slightly from the present rate of approximately 280,000. The government's own estimate is that the employment rate in

Denmark will increase by approximately 40,000 per annum. The labor force will, at the same time, increase by approximately 25,000, causing the unemployment rate to be reduced by merely 10,000 to 15,000 per annum.

#### Unemployment Rate

"The problem of the policy pursued by the government is that the unemployment rate declines too slowly," Nyrop Rasmussen says. The Federation of Trade Unions is willing to contribute to an economic policy strategy as proposed by the government but wants the reduction of the unemployment rate to become an objective on a line with the balance of payments and national budget objectives. "As we have an unemployment rate of 270,000 to 280,000, this means that it will take 16-17 years to reduce the figure to 100,000 at the rate proposed by the government," he points out. "This will lead to many social problems and will cause several generations of young people to become excluded."

The answer of the Federation of Trade Unions is that a reduction of the work week will have to be carried through. The Federation of Trade Unions wants to carry through such a reduction without compensation, so that the reduction will be financed within the same framework which would otherwise have applied. This is the major demand of the Federation of Trade Unions in the collective bargaining for the period of agreement starting on 1 February. Nyrop Rasmussen does not believe that it will be easy to achieve this even if the agreement achieved by the Metal Workers Union in West Germany holds out hopes.

The Danish Employers' Association is prepared to negotiate a reduction of work hours as well but rejects the proposal advanced by the Federation of Trade Unions. "In our opinion, there is no room for an increase in real wages, and it will then also be difficult to fit in a reduction of work hours," Vistisen says. "A reduction of work hours by 1 hour will require a 2 percent lower growth rate of real wages the first year and, subsequently, 1 percent each year," Vistisen points out. "I doubt that the employees will pay this for going home 12 minutes earlier each day."

The Employers' Association, therefore, finds that a reduction of work hours will result in an increased wage drift and points out that a more moderate growth rate in wages will have a greater positive effect on the employment situation. A study undertaken by the Employers' Association last summer, moreover, shows that 20 percent of its member enterprises had difficulties getting hold of labor.

"Bottleneck problems will always exist in an economy which is growing," is the answer of the Federation of Trade Unions on this point.

7262  
CSO: 3639/21

## FOREIGN DEBT OFFSET BY ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE

Athens TA NEA in Greek 26 Oct 84 p 24

/Text/ We are not the only ones to be in debt to foreigners but at the same time foreigners owe us money too. This is what the account records maintained by foreign banks have to say about Greek debts and also Greek claims abroad.

- Overall, we owe 13.6 billion dollars from loans and credits that have been granted us by foreign banks and countries.

- Overall, they owe us 5.8 billion dollars that we have abroad.

A spokesman of the Bank of Greece said yesterday that the Greek foreign debt is not excessive if it is compared to that of other countries, particularly developed countries.

He also said that Greece's foreign debt was as follows as of the end of 1983:

- A total of 9.7 billion dollars according to the Bank of Greece that include long-term and short-term loans of both the public and private sectors plus commercial credits.

- A total of 11.8 billion dollars according to data of the International Settlements Bank and the OECD which include the overall borrowing by Greece from foreign countries plus credits for our defense.

The spokesman said that to these sums must be added the additional sum of 1.8 billion dollars that represent this year's foreign borrowing.

He also said that it is not only foreign banks that have claims on Greece but that Greece too has claims abroad. As he specified, this has to do with deposits abroad and accounts receivable that Greeks and Greek firms and banks have.

As estimated by foreign banks, these claims come to 5.8 billion dollars.

The same source also said the following:

- We will allocate 500 million dollars for the servicing of our debt (repayment instalments and interest).



- Principal and interest instalments are expected to increase from 1986 on at which time the repayment of loans begins.

- The public foreign debt is equal to 25 percent of the gross national product while the principal and interest is equal to 16 percent of the revenues the country brings in from exports, tourism, merchant marine and remittances from emigrants.

As for state deficits, the Bank of Greece estimates that the state budget is burdened this year by several billion drachmas because of the rise in the value of the dollar and the increase in interest rates.

According to the bank, however, this does not mean that the state deficit will increase significantly because some decrease in loans and a substantial increase in public revenues above and beyond original forecasts will come about this year.

It is also being recalled that the overall state deficit had been estimated to be 500 billion this year.

5671

CSO: 3521/74

## SURPLUS IN AGRICULTURAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 1 Nov 84 p 17

/Text/ The improvement in the agricultural balance of payments that had already begun in 1983 continued during the first 6 months of 1984. The surplus of the agricultural balance of payments amounted to 12.4 billion drachmas compared with a deficit of 5.6 billion drachmas in the corresponding period of 1983.

As for our trade with EEC countries, the deficit continues but it is dropping. Specifically, from a 2.6 billion drachma deficit in the first 6 months of 1981, the figure dropped to 2.1 billion drachmas in 1984. (It is to be noted that the deficit was 9.7 billion drachmas in 1982 and 4 billion drachmas in 1983).

The deficit in the agricultural balance of payments with the EEC is covered by the surplus in our agricultural trade with Third World countries. Our country collected 14.5 billion drachmas more than it paid Third World countries from agricultural trade.

The positive trend in our agricultural balance of payments is due primarily to the higher rate of our exports in relation to our imports. Exports to the EEC and Third World countries increased 49.5 percent and 50.4 percent respectively compared with the first 6 months of 1983. The increase in imports was limited to 17 and 13 percent from the EEC and Third World countries respectively.

The increase in the export of fruits and vegetables and also the decrease in the import of meat contributed greatly to the favorable development in the agricultural balance of payments.

It is to be noted that the country's overall trade in fruits and vegetables with the entire world left a profit of more than 29 billion drachmas during the first 6 months of 1984. Exports surpassed 31 billion drachmas, while imports were limited to about 2 billion drachmas. Of the 29 billion drachmas in profits, 18 billion came from fruit and vegetable trade with the EEC. This sum, however, is not considered sufficient given the fact that the deficit from the import and export of meat, from and to the EEC, amounts to 30 billion drachmas. The Ministry of Agriculture maintains that the situation in the agricultural balance of payments will improve still more during the second half of 1984.

5671

CSO: 3521/74

## CONSERVATIVE PARTY CHAIRMAN COMMENTS ON REDUCED UNEMPLOYMENT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 2 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by Bjørn Talen]

[Text] "There are many indications that the trend of the labor market has become reversed and that we may experience reduced unemployment in the future. This is a positive break with the trend which we have had in this area and which begun during the most recent Labor government," the chairman of the Conservative Party, Erling Norvik, said at a meeting at Askim yesterday.

According to the most recent figures, the unemployment rate dropped by 2,069 in the course of October. At the end of the month, the number of registered unemployed was 60,194, and that is almost exactly the same number of unemployed as at the same time last year.

As will appear from the graph, it is thus the first time this year that the unemployment rate has not increased in relation to the same month last year.

"On the contrary, through its economic policy and employment measures, the government has managed to absorb an increasing number of new groups in the labor market, and, as a result, the number of employed is now larger than ever before. There are also several other positive features in the labor market. The extent of leaves of absence and restrictions of work hours is lower than 12 months ago, and an increasing number of vacant work places are reported to employment offices," Erling Norvik said in his lecture.

#### In Due Course

The adviser of the minister of finance, Hans Henrik Ramm, tells AFTENPOSTEN that the new trend in the labor market is an extension of the positive trend that we have seen in industry. We first managed to reduce the price and cost levels to enable industry to take advantage of the international recovery. Once this has happened, stockpiles will first be depleted.

Subsequently, we may have additional export, and the growth in investments has begun. The policy works, even if things have to happen in due course. Ramm says that it will hardly be a question of relaxing labor market measures even if unemployment figures would drop. We shall have to view it as necessary measures of adjustment to meet the future no matter what.


"Now that the general situation in the labor market is better under control, it will become necessary to concentrate the efforts further in the area of specially exposed groups. It is especially important to increase the efforts for unemployed young people, and I am convinced that this will now be done on the part of the government," Erling Norvik said.

Even if the increase in the unemployment rate has come to a stop, the unemployment figures are still high. Many wonder why we did not succeed in our efforts earlier when the unemployment rate was still at a relatively low level. The answer is that it would have been impossible if further difficulties to the Norwegian economy, which is the actual cause of the unemployment problem, were to be avoided.

We knew already when we took over in 1981 that we had a major and difficult job ahead of us in the area of the labor market. In an attempt to win the election, the Labor Party had, for a long time, attempted to stem the difficulties by pouring public grants into the area. Although these grants did, indeed, postpone the problems till after the election, they contributed, at the same time, to a further aggravation of the fundamental problems of the Norwegian economy, the chairman of the Conservative Party pointed out.

If we are now able to look forward to a declining unemployment rate, it is due to the sounder state of the Norwegian economy. Price developments are under control, and the growth rate has been reinforced. That is why we are now able to take a more optimistic view of the future.

Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that the problems have not been solved once and for all. If we should have a change of government after the next election, the Labor Party has told us, through its platform and its alternative budget proposal, that it will continue to pursue its policy of the seventies, when the high rate of inflation undermined the full employment situation, the chairman of the Conservative Party said.



Trend of registered unemployment in 1984 compared to the corresponding month in 1983, number of persons.

Key:

1. Level of unemployment.

7262

CSO: 3639/21



## OSLO EMERGING AS FINANCIAL CENTER FOR NORDIC COUNTRIES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Nov 84 Sect III p 1

[Article by Per Nordrum]

[Text] Oslo is on the way to becoming the new financial center of the North. Norway's foreign debt has almost been repaid, and the oil is producing a large surplus in the balance of payments. Therefore Oslo and Norway have unique opportunities to exploit capital export. This is what the outgoing financial advisor of the Norwegian capital, Bernt H. Lund, says.

"For once we have the jump on the Swedes, and we should take advantage of this," Lund said. "By trying to establish a Nordic financial center the capital will also be able to regain something of what it has lost in the industrial development," he said. Lund puts great emphasis on Norway's oil as a strong argument, but adds that he regards the whole Nordic market as a point of departure for his evaluation.

"But the Norwegian authorities must be in favor of Oslo's becoming the financial center of the North. Up to now it doesn't look as if the authorities have quite realized that our monetary system is a part of the world's monetary system," Lund said, because Norway's Bank (the national bank) is very restrictive on taking up loans abroad. This applies both to businesses and to public institutions. The restrictions also apply to the possibilities for foreigners to borrow money in Norway.

9124

CSO: 3613/35

## INCENTIVE PRACTICES OFFICE HEAD KUNAK ON INVESTMENT

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 4 Nov 84 p 9

[Interview with Incentives Implementation Department Head Fahrettin Kunak by correspondent Osman Ulagay]

[Text] Who Is Fahrettin Kunak?

Fahrettin Kunak was born in 1949. After graduating from the Ankara Preparatory High School, he entered the Middle East Technical University and graduated from the chemistry department. Kunak worked in the private sector between 1972 and 1976. His first government post was in the Ministry of Agriculture. Later, he worked in the State Planning Organization, and for a while he served as head of the Foreign Capital Department. Kunak was recently appointed as head of the Incentives Implementation Department, and he is currently supervising the preparatory work for the new incentives system.

Our guest in this week's "Economic Dialog" is Incentives Implementation Department Head Fahrettin Kunak. We discussed with him the newly introduced incentives package to encourage investments and the support and facilities that will be offered to investors.

Question: Mr Kunak, what were your primary goals in introducing the new incentives system for investors? What were the primary targets in order of importance?

Kunak: The first fundamental goal is to boost investments within a certain system. The second goal is to move some of the investments from the west to the east within the framework of the government's general policy. And the third basic goal is to simplify the investment incentive system. These were the three primary goals we had in mind in developing the new incentives system. The new arrangements were made and put in place for this purpose.

Question: Let us begin with the third goal. By referring to a more "simplified system", I presume that you are speaking about an implementation which will reduce bureaucratic obstacles before the investors to a minimum.

Kunak: Naturally. We want to support the investor and to help him in the solution of his problems, if any, so that investments can be accelerated and the investor can complete all the bureaucratic formalities as quickly as possible.

Question: Are there any incentives which will insure the completion of the investments in the shortest possible time?

Kunak: To do exactly that, we want to reduce the duration of the investment process as much as possible by following up on the investor and by helping him to resolve any problems he might have with government offices and banks.

Question: You are saying, in other words, that the investor can turn to you if he encounters any difficulties.

Kunak: That is correct. For example, let us say that the investor cannot get a municipal building permit. If he comes to us, our colleagues will go with him to the municipality concerned and will try to resolve his problem.

Question: Let us go on to the second goal you mentioned. It appears that the dosage of all forms of incentives increases as the location of the investment moves from the west to Eastern Anatolia.

Kunak: Yes. The availability of all forms of incentives increases as one moves from Turkey's west to the east.

Question: What are the major incentives which exhibit this characteristic?

Kunak: As you know, with this new arrangement we divided Turkey into four types of regions. We call them a) developed regions, b) normal regions, c) regions with first priority in development, and d) regions with second priority in development. Now, if, for example, the investment deduction in developed regions is 30 percent, in regions with first priority in development that figure rises to 100 percent. The minimum capital requirement sought for investments goes down as one moves from the west to the east. Similar differentials apply to tax and fee exemptions--that is, there are more exemptions as one moves toward the east. The most important incentive factor is the investment deduction. An investor who invests in a first priority region will be able to deduct 100 percent of his investment from his taxes in future years. That is a significant advantage.

Question: It appears that another goal of the new incentives system is to generally force the investor to increase his capital.

Kunak: The capital requirement has been increased for investments within developed regions, which include the provinces of Istanbul and Kocaeli and areas within the municipal boundaries of Ankara, Izmir and Bursa. But the capital requirement goes down as one moves toward the east. Consequently, we cannot say that the capital requirement has been increased in general. Moreover, we will support the investor who has progressed in his investment to a certain stage by giving him interest differentials on his capital.

Question: Will an investor who has reached a certain stage in his investment automatically qualify for such support? In other words, will he receive interest differential rebates for the capital he has used?

Kunak: Yes, he will. We are still working on the details of that procedure. When the work is completed the Central Bank will disclose the details in a directive.

Question: Also, if I am not wrong, you published a list of sectors that will not receive incentives in order to differentiate among sectors. That is you determined the sectors that will, in your words, receive disincentives. These sectors include the automobile, tractor, battery and machine-woven rug industries. What criteria did you use in preparing this list?

Kunak: In Turkey there are saturated sectors in which no additional production capacity needs to be built. Examples are the automobile and tractor industries. We are saying that, the government will no longer provide incentives for these industries. But, here too, you must note that in regions with priority in development all investments are to be encouraged irrespective of this list of industries subject to disincentives.

Question: Are there any special provisions in this new system that will encourage labor-intensive investments?

Kunak: As you know, this is a matter that is extensively covered by the government program, so that we do not need to explain this issue separately. The government attaches high priority to labor-intensive industries. But let us not forget that what Turkey needs today is investments. Turkey will benefit in every respect if investments are expedited in labor-intensive as well as other industries.

Question: In other words, you are saying that bolstering the investment spirit is your foremost goal, and you are hoping to attract everyone including those who have only thought about investing.

Kunak: Yes, even those who have only thought about it. In Turkey today there are individuals who have invested in the past and who have grown tired of it. They have the money and the means, but they suffice with the factory they have built in the past; they do not build new factories. With these new incentives we are trying to induce such individuals to build second and third factories. We want to revitalize the investment spirit.

Question: I understand that the new system encompasses special easements for investments of up to 600 million Turkish liras.

Kunak: Yes. We specially simplified the procedures for obtaining incentive documents for investments of up to 600 million Turkish liras. We determined that investments of up to 600 million Turkish liras are standard investments. In such investments, we will even supply the feasibility reports. We are hoping that we will be able to grant incentive documents in a single day to investors who will fill out a simple form and provide the necessary information.

Question: The investor who obtains an incentive document will no longer have to obtain an implementation document. Is that not right?

Kunak: No, he will not have to. From now on, the incentive document will be the only document needed to take advantage of the incentive measures. However, let me remind you that the terms of obtaining incentive documents for investments of over 600 million Turkish liras are slightly different and more complex.

Question: There are also inducements for investments of over 5 billion Turkish liras.

Kunak: In such circumstances we are trying to encourage the formation of large manufacturing units which can compete overseas. For example, in such cases the capital requirement is reduced to 30 percent of the total investment.

Question: Mr Kunak, at this point is there a message you would like to convey to prospective investors?

Kunak: The system that has been introduced is very liberal and highly novel in terms of procedural formalities and implementation. When prospective investors study these arrangements carefully, they will begin to think seriously about investing.

Question: And if they encounter any difficulties?

Kunak: They should contact us by phone or telex or even in person. The Incentives Implementation Department is prepared to help them in every way.

9588

CSO: 3554/41



## OIL, GAS PRODUCTION INCREASED BY THIRTEEN PERCENT IN 1983

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Oct 84 p 5

[Text] The total Norwegian production of oil and gas amounted to 44.6 million tons of oil equivalents during the nine first months of the year. This is an increase of nearly 13 percent over the same period last year. The oil production amounted to 24.4 million tons during the nine first months of the year, while the gas production amounted to 19.2 million tons.

During the period January-September, the oil production from the Norwegian section of the Statfjord field reached 13.3 million tons. This is an increase of nearly 17 percent over the same period last year. In September, the average daily production from the Statfjord field had reached 404,000 barrels.

The oil production of the Ekofisk field dropped from 9.9 million tons to 8.6 million tons during the nine first months. The gas production dropped from 9.5 million tons to 8.9 million tons.

The gas production from the Frigg field has, on the other hand, increased from 7.6 million tons to 9.7 million tons. This constitutes the Norwegian share of the production from Frigg as well as the production from the fields North-East Frigg and Odin.

In August, the Norwegian share of the production from the Murchison field amounted to 153,000 tons of oil and 6,634 tons of gas. Valhall produced 1.7 million tons of oil during the nine first months of the year.

7262

CSO: 3639/21

## BRIEFS

SWEDEN, DENMARK SIGN LIMIT TREATY--Last Thursday, the Swedish government approved the agreement with Denmark on a division of the continental shelf and the fishing zones in the Cattegat, the Skagerrak and the Baltic between Denmark and Sweden. The treaty was signed today in Copenhagen by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party) and Swedish Ambassador Carl de Geer. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Nov 84 p 4] 7262

CSO: 3613/30

## ANTARCTIC RESEARCH EXPEDITION SET TO BEGIN

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Oct 84 p 30

[Article by Torill Nordeng]

[Text] By the Andenes of the Coast Guard to the Antarctic, to participate in Norway's hitherto largest scientific expedition at the bottom of the world! At the end of November, the vessel will sail southward from Oslo. In the course of the Christmas holidays, approximately 30 Norwegian researchers will board the vessel, from an Argentinian port. The brief Antarctic "height of summer" will have to be fully utilized, weather permitting. It is Queen Maud Land and the Weddell Sea which will be further researched. The Norwegian Polar Institute is in charge of the planning as well as of the expedition itself. A grant of 14.5 million kroner has been proposed over the national budget.

Only one reporter and one photographer will be allowed to accompany Norway's hitherto largest scientific Antarctic expedition. On 26 December, Torill Nordeng, a reporter with AFTENPOSTEN, and Egil Eriksson, a photographer with STAVANGER AFTENBLAD, will travel south to Argentina. They will participate in the expedition of 2 months on board the Andenes of the Norwegian Coast Guard right from the departure till the return of the vessel.

The reason why Norwegian scientists go to the Antarctic this time is to carry on a scientific field study of previous large Norwegian Antarctic expeditions, the most recent one of which took place 6 years ago. Also that expedition was under the auspices of the Norwegian Polar Institute.

However, in starting out on its trip, the expedition is keeping up old Norwegian traditions. One hundred and ten years ago, Norwegian whalers undertook the first landing on the continent.

It is also a Norwegian reply to the international political engagement toward an inhospitable and more or less inaccessible continent. There is talk about mineral resources--oil, there is talk about food resources, and it is our world's fresh water reserve, should somebody invent methods for profitable

exploitation. There is also talk about who, if anybody, will be exploiting the hidden resources.

So far, the issues are in cold storage, literally speaking. Nobody really knows what is hidden under the ice and under the sea floor, and the Antarctic Treaty protects the continent.

It is a treaty on which both East-West and North-South are agreed. It is regarded as a good instrument for avoiding conflicts, and it has been stressed repeatedly that the treaty is unique in our present conflict-filled world. It works the way it was meant to do.

Nevertheless, some disagreement does exist. The Antarctic has become a current issue in the UN. It is Malaysia which has asked whether the Antarctic with its possible wealth of resources, ought to become the common heritage of mankind and be administered accordingly. Today, a total of 31 nations have signed the treaty. Sixteen countries have a so-called consultative status. Norway is one of them.

In addition, Norway claims a territory in the Antarctic. Queen Maud Land was annexed on 14 January 1939. The unique treaty may be revised in 1991, should anybody want it. It will then be 30 years since it took effect. The questions of territorial claims will be taken up.

#### Norwegian Research in 1985

It is glaciologist Olav Orheim who is the leader of this year's Antarctic expedition. He has been there eleven times before and knows what awaits him as well as the other participants in the expedition. They come from fifteen different research institutes, most of them from the University of Bergen and from the Norwegian Polar Institute. It is interesting to note that also a Swedish glaciologist will participate in the expedition. Sweden wishes to become familiar with the conditions in the Antarctic in preparation for more extensive Swedish Antarctic activity, it says in the statement giving the reasons for his participation. Sweden and Finland have recently signed the Antarctic Treaty.

It is advanced and comprehensive research which will be taking place on and among the icebergs this summer at the South Pole. Also in the mountains on land. The geology under the sea floor will be studied. In the sea, currents, winds, temperatures, and saltiness will be measured, to mention some of the things.

And the icebergs protrude from the sea. (My elementary school teacher said that only one tenth is visible. And who does not remember the Titanic.)

While researchers on board the Andenes will be crisscrossing the Weddell Sea, studying it thoroughly, with seasickness and the pack ice as their challenge, two research groups will be put ashore. In the Gjelsvik Mountains, geologists, ornithologists, surveyors, glaciologists, botanists, and zoologists will be staying in tents for several weeks. And while the Antarctic storms will be

threatening to move their "house" on top of the nearest mountain top.

Also the Heimefront Mountains will be visited. The program says geology. The Antarctic, Africa and India probably once constituted the same continent. At any rate, studies will be made to find out whether the Heimefront Mountains contain the same rocks as those found in East Africa, inside Madagascar.

It will be a new, but hardly too different task for the Andenes and Commander Torstein Myhre, maneuvering across the South Atlantic and into the pack ice. The Andenes has its fixed field of operation along the Norwegian coast and on the fishing banks off Spitzbergen and in the Barents Sea, with summer storms and ice.


This will, however, be the first time for a Norwegian research expedition in the Antarctic to use the Norwegian Coast Guard. The U.S. Coast Guard (the American coast guard) has been on several expeditions to the Antarctic, with both Norwegian and American researchers onboard. As far as AFTENPOSTEN/STAVANGER AFTENBLAD have learned, these expeditions are also inspection expeditions.

And there is full access to the expeditions of other nations' research stations, according to the treaty. Free and open research will be carried on, and there will be no military activities. The Antarctic has, moreover, been declared nuclear-free. The ice will not be allowed to be used for storage of nuclear waste.

The Norwegian Coast Guard has pointed out that the expedition will provide the officers of the Norwegian Navy with valuable experience in operating in polar regions. The vessel will, moreover, be given a chance to show what it is capable of doing.

The entire Antarctic is 1.3 times the size of Europe. The ice on land is in the thickest areas 4,000 meters thick. Temperatures of 78 degrees below zero have been measured there, but in the sea, seals, whales and teals thrive. It is moreover, the land of the penguins.





- Key:
- |                     |                                  |
|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. South Atlantic   | 8. Queen Maud Land               |
| 2. South Georgia    | 9. South Pole                    |
| 3. Bouvet Island    | 10. France                       |
| 4. Great Britain    | 11. Areas not claimed by anybody |
| 5. Falkland Islands | 12. Indian Ocean                 |
| 6. Norway           |                                  |
| 7. Weddell Sea      |                                  |

262  
CSO: 3633/21

## ENVIRONMENT MINISTER DISCUSSES ACID RAIN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Nov 84 p 12

[Article by Jens J. Kjærgaard]

[Text] Research in the area of pollution will have to be given higher priority, says Environment Minister Chr. Christensen.

"It is high time that we give higher priority to the research in connection with the pollution which threatens the earth, the vegetation and our nature areas," Environment Minister Chr. Christensen said yesterday in his introduction to a major debate on the effects of acid rain on agriculture, held at the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural College. In the same meeting, Erik Holmsgaard, principal of the State Forestry Research Service, said that an error may have been made in setting up plantations in areas of poor soil, which perhaps ought to have remained moorland.

There has been a rather heated debate with divided opinions on the effects of acid rain on Danish forests. The problems are quite complicated and have far from been clarified. This did not happen either at the meeting last Saturday, which had been arranged by the Environmental Protection Center.

"The primary question is, however, how long the responsible authorities dare and should wait for the certain scientific evidence on the causes and effects before they take action," the minister said.

"The politicians do not possess the necessary knowledge to present the right proposals, we have to provide more funds for research. I can very well imagine the situation that, in the not too distant future, the environmental authorities will be blamed, and justly so, for not intervening in time to stop the pollution, the effects of which on our forests may be difficult, if not impossible, to remedy."

Chr. Christensen concluded by saying:

"There is no time to be lost if we shall manage to gather the desired knowledge before being forced into major national and international political decisions in the area. Pollution knows no limits."

Hans Flugger, principal, of the Air Pollution Laboratory of the Environmental Board at Risø, stated at the meeting that Denmark exports even more sulphur to the Soviet Union than to Sweden.

Incidentally, Flyger criticized the expressions "acid precipitation" and "acid rain." From a technical point of view, they are misleading fashionable expressions as it is not necessarily a question of acidity or rain.

#### Death of Forests

"Damage to our Danish forests may remind one of the destructions in Germany, but they may be primarily ascribed to climatic conditions, the after-effects of the most recent big storm, summer drought or salt damage," said Erik Holmsgaard, principal, of the State Forestry Research Service.

The principal of the State Forestry Research Service did not rule out the possibility that Denmark may be hit by death of our forests as in Germany, but the danger is not imminent. Partly because we have less pollution and we fell our trees at an earlier point. It is the old trees which are exposed the most.

"In the long run, acid rain may ruin the conditions of growth, especially in areas where the soil is very poor, and it is a question whether we were too economical in developing our plantations. We may have planted trees where the land ought to have remained moorland."

There are many and obvious reasons why we hardly need fear the death of our forests in Denmark, Arne Skytt Andersen, university lecturer, and Henrik Saxe, holder of a senior research scholarship, said. The Danish soil is able to withstand more, it is a question of buffer capacity.

7262

CSO: 3613/30

## CONSENSUS IN ENVIRONMENT POLICY SEEN JEOPARDIZED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Nov 84 p 11

[Commentary by 'Monitor']

[Text] Monitor sees dangerous signs that the broad political basis for the environmental policy may crumble away. That is worth avoiding.

The environmental law has now been in force for a decade. In the course of those years, a tradition has been established, through determined and systematic efforts, how to pursue environmental policy in this country. From the very start, it has been considered important that the official measures against pollution be based on the broadest possible support.

It was entirely in accordance with the intentions that the environmental law in 1973 was adopted with a broad political support in the Folketing. It was a legislation supported not only by the then Social Democratic government and its supporters but also by the Conservative Party. At the same time, it was a legislation which was supported by the organizations of the trades and industries. When the bill was being read in the Folketing, there was no doubt that the Federation of Danish Industries was able to support it wholeheartedly.

The Federation of Danish Industries had two reasons for doing it! First, it was recognized also within the industries that we had got environmental problems, and that neither the industries nor any other potential polluters would be able to talk themselves out of it. Second, the legislation had been framed in a way which the industries were able to live with. The law was no declaration of war but a balanced way of solving a number of problems which were becoming increasingly urgent.

That tradition has since then been developed. Successive ministers of the environment, strongly encouraged by their officials, have done what they could to maintain the broad support. It is a policy which has paid.

At the revision of the environmental law in 1982, the political basis for the environmental policy was extended to comprise the Liberal Party as well, which as late as in 1973 had had its scruples.

The broad consensus has, undoubtedly, been valuable. Pollution and environmental issues have never become the controversial issues that they have been in other countries. Denmark has been able to avoid the radicalization of the environmental policy which of recent years has threatened to change West-German politics in an unfortunate direction. Everything thus appears to be progressing favorably and a politically tenable balance appears to have been found between the regard for the environment and the regard for the economic costs in which enterprises and the population have been involved on account of the environmental regulations.

Against that background, it might seem out of place to discuss whether things will continue that way. It is, after all, only a couple of years since the nearly unanimous Folketing was able to give its support to the up-dating of the environmental legislation for which the then government had received the support of practically all organizations involved.

Nevertheless, there are increasing signs that the broad support of the environmental policy may crumble away. For the same reason, it may be risky to ignore the possibility that environmental policy issues in the not too distant future may become a new area of conflict in Danish politics. Should this happen, it will not only become difficult to carry on a balanced environmental policy. It will also affect the general political climate in an unfortunate and destabilizing direction. The collapse of the broad agreement of former times on the security and the foreign policies has given us a foretaste of such effects. The development south of the border, at the same time, teaches us how environmental and pollution problems may cause the political climate to become unhealthy.

Unfortunately, there are far too many signs that the serene atmosphere will not last. With a nonsocialist minority government, it is tempting for the other majority in the Folketing to manifest itself in this area. The Radical Liberal Party has an unresolved green complex.

The Christian People's Party, with the minister of environment as the party's only member of the government, has the same need to show its profile in this very area. Finally, the Social Democratic Party in opposition is easy to tempt if it may combine the desire to annoy the government with the need to manifest itself in relation to a green and partly irresponsible Socialist People's Party. The agreement on combating the pollution from coal-fired power plants was an example of how the policy may get going. The minister of environment's somewhat clumsy way of handling the IBM's building case may correspondingly release new confrontations when other large individual cases end up on the minister's table. The question whether the drug firm of Lundbeck should be permitted to expand its factory at Lumsås may very well turn out to be such a case which may cause the whole thing to collapse. In that context, it is by no means certain that Christian Christensen was sufficiently far-seeing when he made his decision in the IBM case to enable him in the Lundbeck case and similar future cases to balance environmental



considerations with economic considerations, which, according to the environmental law, must also be included in such cases.

There are other signs that the broad support behind the environmental policy is in the process of disintegrating. The environmental organizations have, to an increasing extent, managed to assert themselves toward the ministry. This happens at the same time as moderate organizations, such as the Danish Anglers' Association and the Danish Society for the Preservation of Natural Amenities, on account of the competition and more fanatical groups, feel pressured into radicalization. The farther this process goes, the greater is the risk that the organizations of the trades and industries, headed by the Federation of Danish Industries, will conclude that they will no longer be able to participate.

A decisive strength of the hitherto environmental policy has been the fact that it is based on a quite far-reaching decentralization. This is due to a recognition that the entire country may not necessarily have the same problems, and that it, therefore, may be reasonable to give different priorities when balancing the environment and the economy against one another. An environmental legislation which, in this way, places important decisions with the politicians of municipal boards and county boards has been based on the realization that it is here a question of basically political decisions. Such decisions are made better and more correctly by politicians with local roots than by officials in Copenhagen, not to mention politicians within the environmental committee of the Folketing.

The municipalities and counties will go a long way to maintain these principles. They may have many, more or less good reasons for it. That is not decisive. The decisive thing is that decentralization in this area is part of the basis for broad agreement on the environmental policy. If it is to be preserved, doubts may not be raised, as done by the minister of the environment recently, whether the municipalities, in their administration of the environmental legislation, do, indeed, live up to their obligations to supervise the polluters. Should there be the least basis for such criticism of the local environmental authorities, the demand for the establishment of a state-operated environmental police becomes topical. In view of the present political development in the area, the majority might soon be in favor of it. In that case, the broad political support of the environmental policy has, indeed, become undermined, and the stage has been set for the formation of a new administration with not very desirable consequences.

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**DATE FILMED**

12 Dec 1984